Interview with Ambassador Alfred H. Moses

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR ALFRED H. MOSES

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

Initial interview date: February 16, 2005

Q: Today is February 16, 2005. This is an interview with Alfred H. Moses. What does the H stand for?

MOSES: Henry.

Q: Henry. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. I notice by listening to conversations you have had that you have been able to hang on to the name Alfred. With people this must have been a battle in early years.

MOSES: Well it was Al early on and Al still. I don't really care. My family always called me Alfred.

Q: Well to begin with, could you tell me when and where you were born?

MOSES: Sure. July 24, 1929 in Baltimore, Maryland.

Q: Then could you tell me a little bit about the family. Let's take your father's side. Where did it come from?

MOSES: My father's family, the Moses's, came from Germany, from a small town called Grobropperhausen in the Rhine valley. I have been there. The family lived there for three to four hundred years.

Q: What were they doing?

MOSES: They were dealers in cattle hides. My grandfather came to this country in 1872 as a boy of 15, after German Unification.

Q: Did he come to Baltimore?

MOSES: No, he went to Statesville, North Carolina. That is where my father was born.

Q: Well why Statesville, North Carolina. I can think of Baltimore being sort of a very much German town, but Statesville, North Carolina?

MOSES: There was a family from Grobropperhausen named Wallace. I doubt the name was Wallace in Germany, but it was Wallace in the United States. They were in the medicinal herb business. My grandfather went to Statesville, North Carolina to work for them.

Q: Fine. Well then did your father grow up in Statesville?

MOSES: No. His father died when he was three years of age, and his mother, who was from Baltimore, moved back to Baltimore. My grandfather is buried in Statesville. I visited his grave a few years ago to say the “kaddish,” the Jewish mourner's prayer.

Q: And what did your father do in Baltimore?

MOSES: He was a hat manufacturer. It was his grandfather's business, his maternal grandfather.

Q: Well did your father go to college?

MOSES: He did not. He graduated from an all-boys academic high school first in his class, but he was the oldest son of a widowed mother, and he went to work in the family business.

Q: Well usually in those days, if you graduated from one of the good high schools, this was probably as good an education as any kid could get anyway.

MOSES: Well it was good. He was very intelligent. He studied calculus, classical Greek, Latin, German and, of course, English. He was well read. His brother, who was two years younger, graduated first in his class from Johns Hopkins.

Q: Well on your mother's side, where did they come from?

MOSES: We only got to my father's father. My father's mother was born in England in 1863 and came here when Abraham Lincoln was president. She came as an infant and lived to be 101, so I knew her very well.

Q: Good heavens.

MOSES: Her mother was from Grodno, Poland, and her father from Posen, Germany-Poland. Her father, my great-grandfather, moved to England as a boy, where he was apprenticed to a tailor. Her mother went to Manchester from Grodno as a very young girl, and came to the United States with my grandmother in 1863.

Q: Well how did your mother and father get together?

MOSES: In Baltimore. My father moved back to Baltimore when his father died in 1890. My mother's family was in Baltimore. Her father's family, their name was Lobe, came from

Holland. Her mother's father's name was Bachrach and they came from Germany. The Lobe's came here in 1830, and the Bachrach's in the 1840's.

Q: Well then basically you grew up in Baltimore?

MOSES: I did.

Q: What part of Baltimore?

MOSES: Northwest Baltimore.

Q: How sort of Jewish was your upbringing? Was this a strong element in your family and neighborhood or not?

MOSES: Yes. I went to public school, but I also went to religious school three days a week. We kept the dietary laws. We did not work or ride on the Sabbath from Friday night to Saturday night. My father and I went to synagogue every Saturday. We walked. It was very central to my upbringing, but not to the exclusion of a larger slice of life.

Q: Well describe about during the period you were there, the Jewish community in Baltimore.

MOSES: The community numbered about 100,000 people. My father's family had been very prominent in the community. My great-grandfather, Michael Simon Levy, had been one of the pillars of the community, one of the major philanthropists, and that carried over to his sons. Less so in my father's generation because the business, which was the hat business, was on the decline.

Q: It was straw hats.

MOSES: Yes. In its day, it was the largest straw hat manufacturer in the world.

Q: Yes, I recall vividly on the 21st of June...

MOSES: Fifteenth of May, Straw Hat Day. Here you see a picture of my great-grandfather's straw hat factory, which, as I stated, was at one time the largest straw hat manufacturer in the world.

Q: Well it was the fifteenth of May and then what was the day, was it Labor Day you put your fist through the straw hat?

MOSES: I think it was the fifteenth of September. But I have had a great Talmudic debate with a friend as to when you put on a felt hat. The rule is the fifteenth of September, but if Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year, comes earlier, you don a felt hat then. So it is May 15 to Rosh Hashanah, or September 15, whichever comes first.

Q: Today, we both come from the same generation, I was born in 1928. We know the straw hat culture which is gone.

MOSES: It is all gone.

Q: Well now, did your family, I heard on the telephone a little while ago that you have a sister named Claire. How many brothers and sisters?

MOSES: I have two sisters, Claire and Amalie. Amalie is older, Claire the younger.

Q: Well now what was family life like sort of growing up at home?

MOSES: Idyllic.

Q: Talk a little about it.

MOSES: My father was a serious person, highly intelligent, a bit nervous, quite anxious. He always had forebodings of economic disaster.

Q: He had been through the depression.

MOSES: He had survived the depression. In 1933 my father and mother built a lovely home on an acre of ground in Baltimore. It is still there, a stucco home of some 5000 to 5500 square feet. Next to us was a farm of some 14 acres. Behind us were woods. Down the street were woods. It was a lovely street. We knew all of our neighbors. We had a very stable upbringing. My mother was a college graduate and was also highly intelligent.

Q: Where did she go to college?

MOSES: Goucher.

Q: Of course this is the pre-eminent girl's school in Baltimore.

MOSES: She graduated in 1924. She was 17 years younger than my father. This was the first and only marriage for both of them. They were both very much involved in community work, my father exclusively in Jewish organizations. He was president of Sinai Hospital and the Board of Jewish Education. My mother, in later years, was president of the women's board of Sinai Hospital. During the war, she was very active in the Red Cross. She headed up training for volunteers. At the time of her death or slightly before she died, she had been president of the Children's Guild in Baltimore which is for children with major physical and emotional problems. Both of my parents were very active in the community, and interested in the world around them.

Q: Well how about sort of around the dining room table? Were there a lot of discussions about world events?

MOSES: All the time. We grew up with that. My father would make pronouncements, which may or may not have had a basis in fact. My mother was more inquiring, and she tried to nurture in me and my sisters an interest in the world around us. I was very

conscious of world events from early childhood. I remember seeing war cards depicting the Italian atrocities in Ethiopia. The invasion took place in '36. I was seven years old.

Q: About '36. I remember...

MOSES: I remember Munich as if it were yesterday. My mother picked me up at school and said, “There is not going to be a war.” I was so disappointed. Of course, I remember the German invasion of Poland, Friday, September 1, 1939, and two days later the British and French declared war. The invasion was on the 1st of September, and the declaration of war was on the 3rd. I followed maps of the German invasion of Poland and later the German invasion of Russia, and the Russian counterattacks in the winters of '42 and '43; I was intently aware of what was happening around the world. I knew the names of most of the world leaders. I knew the names of every country in the world. I could identify them on maps. There were not that many then.

Q: I am sure for you, too, as for me, it was horrible, but a great geography lesson.

MOSES: Actually, I learned geography from my stamp collection. As I said, I knew the countries; I knew the leaders. I remember King Zog of Albania, the Italian invasion of Albania, King Boris of Bulgaria, and King Michael of Romania. I remember Colonel Beck, the foreign minister of Poland. Ribbentrop, Molotov; those names are like my family in terms of familiarity. I remember Daladier returning to Paris from Munich, Chamberlain to London in September 1938.

Q: Were you getting information mainly from the radio or newspapers, the Baltimore Sun?

MOSES: The Baltimore Sun is all I read. Also from the radio, but primarily from the newspaper.

Q: Well now did the enormity of what Hitler was doing to the Jews in Germany prior to the war, was that coming through. I was wondering whether there were Jewish refugees coming to Baltimore or were they mainly directed towards New York?

MOSES: Oh no, we had hundreds and hundreds. Our family sponsored a few. Our family didn't do as much as we should have done. But in our small Orthodox synagogue in Baltimore after Kristallnacht, a whole congregation came from Frankfurt along with its rabbi. So there must have been a hundred or so in that small synagogue who had survived Kristallnacht.

Q: I mean as a young boy with your parents and all, were you absorbing the enormity of what was happening?

MOSES: Yes, and I was not surprised by what we learned when the camps were liberated in January, 1945. I had assumed that Hitler killed most Jews in Germany and beyond.

Q: What about in Baltimore. Was there anti-Semitism? One thinks of H.L. Mencken who was the Sage of Baltimore.

MOSES: I have read Mencken. Mencken was anti-Semitic.

Q: Oh very much so, but I am not sure whether that came out later or whether...

MOSES: Well he was always thought of as a curmudgeon. My parents for some reason admired Mencken, I think because he had written for the Baltimore Sun and later the Mercury.

Q:??? and he was thought of as being a curmudgeon, and of course the American Language Book and all this.

MOSES: He was a clever writer. He was anti-Semitic. He was German and lived in West Baltimore where German ethnicity was high. He wasn't a Nazi; he just found Jews to be

alien to his culture, and I think, in a way, he probably found them a bit challenging to his intellectual highness.

Q: Well in a way he wasn't just anti-Semitic. He was anti just about everything else you could think of.

MOSES: He was a curmudgeon.

Q: Well tell me...

MOSES: He was also anti-black.

Q: Oh yeah. Did you find, did you sense was there anti-Semitism. Were there bounds where you didn't...

MOSES: Oh totally. Jews weren't allowed to live in certain sections of Baltimore, the better sections. There were country clubs where Jews couldn't go or be members. Many of the businesses in Baltimore didn't hire Jews. Jews were prominent in manufacturing, particularly apparel. Large men's clothing manufacturers were Jewish. Jews were prominent in the professions, particularly medicine. There were prominent Jewish lawyers, but Jewish lawyers were in their firms, Christian lawyers in their firms. The big firms had no Jews. Jews taught in the public school system, but by my time there weren't vast numbers. They owned retail stores. Department stores were primarily, but not exclusively, Jewish. The two largest locally owned department stores, Hutzler Brothers and Hochschild-Kohn's were Jewish. They were the two best department stores in Baltimore. It was a very, if not entirely, segregated city.

Q: I came into the foreign service in 1955, and for all of us in that generation in the foreign service, our absolute must was going over to Baltimore to T.I. Swartz where you could find for 45 bucks you could buy very good suits. And the nice thing about it, any season

you could get a summer suit in the middle of the winter in case you were off to Equatorial Guinea or someplace like that.

MOSES: Well, Swartz catered to the Foreign Service; it was a big part of their business. I knew the Swartz family. They were lovely people.

Q: Well they turned out. I remember going to a cocktail party one time and a bunch of foreign service officers were talking about it. We all opened our coats, and we all had the T.I. Swartz label in it.

MOSES: Well, Pic Swartz, whose father was one of the principals in that business is now living in San Antonio.

Q: Well in school, and out of school too, in the first place were you much of a reader?

MOSES: I would say yes. But my intellectual interests developed incrementally starting in high school, mushrooming in college and graduate school, and then law school and beyond.

Q: Well sort of at the elementary school level, what sorts of things interested you?

MOSES: Elementary school? Nothing, except maybe the end of school and lunch hour.

Q: Well recess too.

MOSES: Recess, yes. I liked to fight. I was a poor student in elementary school.

Q: Was this a burden to your mother and particularly to your father?

MOSES: My father determined that I would never go anywhere. In fact after I went on and became “successful,” he said, “Alfred, I never thought you would amount to much.” My older sister was a wonderful student. But I did very poorly in grammar school, not much

better in junior high school. I did reasonably well in high school, and by my senior year I was first in my class in college. So I moved along.

Q: In high school, what sorts of activities were you interested in?

MOSES: I played sports. I did my schoolwork, and really not much else.

Q: Did you find dating was pretty well segregated?

MOSES: Yes, I went out almost entirely with Jewish girls in my parents' social circle, which was boring as hell. But when I was still in high school, I met a Catholic girl. I guess I shouldn't say her name. She was terrific, and I went with her for awhile; then we broke off. In college, I dated, if not exclusively, mostly Jewish girls. After college and graduate school, I had a very good lady friend who later married a professor at Yale. She was Catholic, but my wife, who died last year, was Jewish. The woman I am presently seeing is Jewish. My social circle, certainly in Washington, was probably 70% non-Jewish.

Q: And of course things have changed so much over the years.

MOSES: These days, it is hard to remember who is Jewish and who is not Jewish.

Q: I grew up in a Protestant family, and my family was a little uncomfortable because I was dating some Catholic girls from Baltimore.

MOSES: Well, I dated Christian girls at Goucher. Being exclusively Jewish was never a major part of my life, although I am a very serious Jew.

Q: Where did you go to high school?

MOSES: A school called Baltimore City College. It was founded in 1839 when the word college could also mean high school.

Q: From there where did you go?

MOSES: To Dartmouth College.

Q: Why Dartmouth?

MOSES: Because my mother liked it. I couldn't have cared less.

Q: Did the thought of being stuck in the middle of the wilderness bother you at all?

MOSES: I knew nothing. My mother and father traveled to Maine in the summer. One year they motored through New Hampshire with friends. They said to each other, “This is where we would like our sons to go.” I got in but the other son did not. Later he became president of a fairly large oil company that was the family business. The fact is my mother and father, particularly my mother, liked what she saw at Dartmouth, probably the bucolic setting and general ambiance and reputation. She was always attracted to the non-Jewish world. She wanted me and my sisters to make it big by her lights.

Q: Did you ever read Budd Schulberg?

MOSES: Sure.

Q: Because it was his portrayal of that...

MOSES: What did he write, Winter Carnival?

Q: Winter Carnival, and What Makes Sammy Run?

MOSES: What makes Sammy Run? Is not Dartmouth, it is Hollywood.

Q: New York too.

MOSES: I forgot. I read it 40 years ago. Budd Schulberg went to Dartmouth.

Q: Yeah and I was just wondering because I think he was sort of a city boy going up to Dartmouth.

MOSES: I was sure a city boy and I went to Dartmouth. I ended up liking Dartmouth a great deal.

Q: What courses were you taking at Dartmouth?

MOSES: I majored in international relations.

Q: Was this in a way a natural progression from your interest as a boy in WWII?

MOSES: Absolutely.

Q: Did you have any particular area in international relations that you were looking at?

MOSES: I knew Europe well. I became fascinated with China. I later studied Chinese in Graduate school. I would say primarily European history. It came to me like a duck to water. I say immodestly I was more aware of what was going on than anybody I knew at college. When I took courses in history, government, economics, related to international relations, I just breezed through.

Q: Well you were there from what '47.

MOSES: '47 to '51.

Q: '47 to '51. I had a comparable experience. I went to Williams from '46 to '50. Were you feeling the impact of the veterans?

MOSES: You were there with Fred Shulman, Fred the Red.

Q: Oh yes absolutely. He wrote his book, "International Politics". I remember when he was attacked by McCarthy. I mean a very fine man. And Williams responded very well I must

say, to the McCarthy things. They didn't back down. Did you find that, I know at my time there, the veterans predominated. I mean there was a large...

MOSES: No, we had very few veterans in our class.

Q: I guess I caught the last.

MOSES: '46 was probably the last. '47 I don't think we had more than a handful of veterans.

Q: So this was not a thing. What was college life like then?

MOSES: It was for me a bit austere, a bit isolated. At least for the first two years not particularly enjoyable. I struggled my first year just to do fairly well. My sophomore year I did quite well, and my junior and senior years I did even better.

Q: Did you, I always think of that song, "Dartmouth is in town Again, Run girls Run." Did you...

MOSES: No, the girls all ran when I came to town.

Q: Did you get around to the other colleges?

MOSES: All the time. It would be nothing to drive down to Vassar and have a date, leave Vassar at midnight, get back to Dartmouth at five in the morning and go to class. We were crazy. It is a miracle any of us is alive.

Q: I didn't have a car, so I hitch hiked.

MOSES: I used to get rides with my friends. In my senior year I had a car.

Q: Did any professors there particularly grab you?

MOSES: Yes they did. I had a Chinese professor, Wing-Tsit Chan, who was actually a Chinese culturist, but he taught Chinese history and that fascinated me. Then Professor John Adams who wrote his doctoral dissertation at Princeton on the Serbian army's withdrawal to the Adriatic after its defeat by the Austrians in 1915.

Q: Over Montenegro and all that. That was very nasty.

MOSES: Very nasty. Yes, that was his doctoral dissertation. He was a marvelous lecturer, quite theatrical. I spoke this year at our 50th reunion at Dartmouth and recalled things he said. It drew a laugh as it had 50 years ago. I took four or five courses from him and a professor named John Gazley, a good European historian. Those were the three that I was closest to.

Q: Did you get much of Balkan History considering...

MOSES: A lot from Adams. I knew Balkan history very well. We had a course in Balkan history. Not the Byzantine era, modern Balkan history. It wasn't until I read Norwich's history of Byzantium that was three or four volumes — it goes up to the fall of Constantinople — that I got into the earlier history of the Balkans.

Q: As you were going through college, were you, in the first place was the military in the offing or not?

MOSES: No, I didn't go into the military until 1952.

Q: We both missed no more wars you know. I got out in June of 1950.

MOSES: That is just the right time. The invasion was in June of 1950.

Q: June 25. We are talking about North Korea going into South Korea which re-instituted the draft and all.

MOSES: Exactly.

Q: Well what were you pointed towards?

MOSES: I really didn't have a clear idea. I took examinations for graduate school and was accepted. I applied to Princeton's Woodrow Wilson, Fletcher School, and SAIS. I was accepted at all three and went to Woodrow Wilson. I thought I would have a career in the Foreign Service.

Q: So you were at the Woodrow Wilson school of Princeton. You were there from what?

MOSES: I was there one year. It is a two year program. It is the only thing I failed to complete in my life. I still toy with the idea of going back and getting my masters. I have gone back to lecture. I was bored out of my mind. I felt that the students were bright and conscientious, but dull as can be. They were being trained to join the Bureau of the Budget and, unfortunately, that was of no interest to me, rather than broader international relations. I decided to go to law school. I took the examination and was accepted at Harvard. Then I decided I had been in school long enough, so I joined the Navy and asked Harvard if it would defer me, and it did.

Q: So you were in the navy from '52 to...

MOSES: '56.

Q: '56. What were you doing in the navy?

MOSES: I was a naval intelligence officer.

Q: Where did you go to naval OCS?

MOSES: At Newport, Rhode Island.

Q: And did they then identify you as somebody who could be an intelligence officer?

MOSES: No, not at all. I couldn't pass the eye exam to be a non-restricted line officer, so the only thing I could qualify for was Naval intelligence. The training at Newport was the same for everybody, the same for all seamen recruits. We were the lowest of the low. It was 16 weeks learning how to be an officer aboard ship.

Q: Well then can we talk a bit about what you were doing in naval intelligence?

MOSES: I was assigned to NSA on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Q: Well NSA being...

MOSES: The National Security Agency, the same as it is today.

Q: Well you were part of which essentially in those days was monitoring...

MOSES: I was monitoring Chinese naval river traffic.

Q: Well while you were doing that I was a language officer, well not officer, I was an enlisted man to Monterrey. I monitored Soviet airport things. Great training ground for an awful lot of people I met later on who got involved in the foreign service. Where were you stationed?

MOSES: In Washington.

Q: How did you find that to work?

MOSES: I loved it because I went to law school at night.

Q: Where did you go to law school?

MOSES: Georgetown.

Q: Georgetown. So this meant you were pretty busy.

MOSES: Yes, and if I was on night duty, which I was part of the time, I went to day school. If I was on duty during the day, I went to night school.

Q: Were you monitoring or were you reading the transcripts of things that were monitored?

MOSES: I was reading transcripts.

Q: What was the impression of the Chinese Navy in those days?

MOSES: It hardly existed. They had one cruiser, the Chunking, that had been a British cruiser called the Aurora. The Brits gave it to the Kuomintang in '46 or '47. They had some river craft and that was about it.

Q: So there really wasn't much to, but how did you like the navy?

MOSES: I loved the Navy.

Q: At Georgetown Law at a certain point did you sort of branch off to specialize in any particular type of law?

MOSES: I don't think there was any specialization then. There were many required courses, some electives. But I had no specialty. Ironically, when I came to Covington, the first thing they had me do which I did for the next 20 years, was tax work. I had never taken a course in taxation in law school. I just learned it on the job.

Q: Well it is probably the best way to learn it anyway.

MOSES: There were others in my age group who were doing tax work. One had been editor-in-chief of the Harvard Law Review. He knew a lot of tax law when he arrived. They all did. I knew nothing. I had never taken a course in tax or accounting. For some reason

I was able to adapt. I read at night. So after two or three years, I knew a hell of a lot of tax law.

Q: Well you got out of the Navy in...

MOSES: February 1956.

Q: How did you stand? Had you finished your law degree by then?

MOSES: No, I graduated from law school the following October, but I took the bar exam in June, '56 before I graduated. I passed the bar and came to work at Covington & Burling in September of 1956 as an associate. I still had not graduated from law school.

Q: Had you gotten married in this time?

MOSES: Yes, I was married in November, '55.

Q: What was the background of your wife?

MOSES: She was a graduate of Vassar College with training in education, nursery school, post-nursery school. She taught for a year at the Bank School in New York. Then we got married and she came here. She taught at National Cathedral and at Holton Arms. She set up the program at Holton Junior College to train teachers.

Q: So you became a real Washingtonian then?

MOSES: Yes.

Q: Can you talk about the law firm when you came in.

MOSES: Yes there were about...

Q: You came in about '56?

MOSES: I arrived September 19, 1956. There were about 90 lawyers. It was thought to be, and probably was, the best law firm in Washington. The most famous partner was Dean Acheson who had been Secretary of State. He was here. There were two partners more senior than Acheson. One was John Lord O'Brian who was an enormous name at the bar and had been assistant attorney general in WWI. He claimed, with some pride, that he hired J. Edgar Hoover, and I think he did. The head of the firm was Edward Burling, who was a giant of a man both physically and intellectually. He was then in his 80's.

Q: Well when you came in, what was sort of the focus of the firm?

MOSES: In those days it was a Washington practice. A lot of antitrust, a lot of regulatory work. We had a partner named Tommy Austern, who had clerked for Justice Brandeis. He had an enormous regulatory practice before the FTC and the Food and Drug Administration. If he didn't have the biggest law practice in the country, it must have been close to it. We had Hugh Cox who was a superb appellate advocate. Justice Harlan called him the “perfect advocate.” I think my first or second year here, he argued the Dupont, General Motors case. He was a brilliant lawyer, extraordinarily cultured, well read, refined. Gerry Gesell, later a federal district court judge, was a marvelous trial lawyer. Howard Westwood and others represented the transportation industry, American Airlines, the American Transportation Association, major railroads, the Pennsylvania Railroad, and other major U.S. corporations such as Dupont. I remember doing work for the biggest companies in the country.

Q: How did lawyers work in this environment? I mean your law firm doing, what would you do as a lawyer?

MOSES: When I came in, I was assigned to work for a tax partner. I did tax work for two or three years. I also was sent to Legal Aid. So for six months I spent my time with Legal Aid trying cases, which was my m#tier. I loved that.

Q: What does that mean trying cases?

MOSES: I was representing indigents in the District on whatever problems they had. The most personal problems, family relations, government benefit claims, various kinds of harassment suits. I was also for the next ten years or so assigned by the district court to represent defendants in criminal cases. I was in the courts a good deal. I did both tax work and litigation. Starting in '62 I was doing more litigation, less tax work. From that my practice evolved into doing representational work for clients around the country, around the world on whatever their problems were. A lot of litigation, but an enormous amount of negotiation, business agreements, whatever.

Q: I am looking at the time now, and I will put at the end here, so we will know where to pick this up. We are talking about the mid '50's. You talked about your work in the law firm. I would like to ask about sort of the legal atmosphere in Washington, DC in the late '50's, still the Eisenhower period. Also, since you did legal aid, the justice system and the government system in Washington, DC and then we will talk about any interest you have in the politics, because that is Washington. And we will talk about some of the clients you had and what you were doing and all that.

MOSES: Fine.

Q: Today is 28 March 2005. Ambassador, here we go. Let's talk a bit about the 1950's and all. What was, you know things change a lot. In the 1950's what would you say the legal climate was? I mean was there sort of the K Street corridor of lobbyists or was it a different feeling?

MOSES: That is a fair question. I wasn't aware of lobbying. My law firm, Covington & Burling, didn't lobby. I think in those days we weren't registered under the Lobbying Act. But we worked on matters that had high public identification and interest. We worked on the deportation of the former dictator of Venezuela. Hugh Cox argued the Dupont, General

Motors case which may have been the most celebrated antitrust case since the breakup of Standard Oil under Theodore Roosevelt. We represented American Airlines, which was very high profile, on route applications. We represented the Pennsylvania Railroad that was the dominant railroad in the East. We represented major corporations. Dupont. I remember Gillette came and asked me to work on their foreign tax issues. I did the reorganization of Interpublic, an advertising agency, a very complex matter. But lobbying wasn't part of what Covington & Burling did, and it is something I never did as such other than on a pro bono basis for public interest groups. The major law firms at that time were Covington, which was the largest law firm, Hogan & Hartson, which was more of a local firm, in the Colorado Building in downtown Washington. Arnold & Porter, and, of course, then Abe Fortas' name was in the firm. It was Arnold, Fortas & Porter. It was a prominent firm. And about that time I think Lloyd Cutler and John Pickering along with Mr. Wilmer set up Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering. That was certainly a superb law firm. The out of town law firms weren't here. I think in the '50's there was no New York firm, other than Cleary Gottlieb, that had both a Washington office and a New York office. It was quite fraternal. You had the uptown bar which we were part of, and then you had the so-called 5th Street lawyers who did the criminal work, the street crime work, and tort work. There were some very good plaintiff's lawyers, David Bress, later a United States attorney, and Joe Bowman who was a good plaintiff's lawyer, and others. And there were a few well known criminal lawyers. Edward Bennett Williams, of course, but in the mid '50's Ed Williams hadn't come into the prominence he did in succeeding decades, nor had Paul Connolly. Paul was still at Hogan & Hartson. Ed I think, was on his own by then. But it was a much smaller bar, and it was much more local. The divisions were between those who were born in Washington or went to law schools in this area, GW and Georgetown, and the uptown bar which was populated by lawyers such as myself who were not born in Washington and went to Ivy League schools. I had gone to Dartmouth and Princeton, but I came here and went to Georgetown Law School, so I had my feet on both sides of the line, which was a great advantage. I knew local people, particularly those who graduated around my time. Having gone to Georgetown, I felt some affinity to the District Court here which was then

populated by judges who had graduated from Georgetown. Bo Laws was the chief judge. He had gone to Georgetown. On the Court of Appeals were Barrett Prettyman and others who had gone to Georgetown. I think Judge Fahey had gone to Georgetown as well. Many of the judges before whom I tried cases were Georgetown graduates. I don't know whether that helped or hurt, but I had some pride in being able to say to myself, I had gone to the same law school as the judge. We had, I think, more of a sense of fraternity and collegiality than exists today.

Q: I have the feeling that today you know there is such a sense of partisanship. I mean you fall in one place or another. Is that a fair thing to say, and was it a different attitude?

MOSES: Political partisanship?

Q: Yeah.

MOSES: Well, I have never seen it as acute as it is today. I think this crowd is almost Stalinist. I signed an ad for John Kerry along with a hundred or so other former ambassadors. John Eisenhower signed as well. I have been taken to task by people in the Administration for having signed that ad. I just came back from Geneva where our Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Kevin Moley, barely talks to me today. Rudy Boschwitz, a former senator who is chairing the U.S. delegation, is very critical of my having signed the ad. I said to Rudy, “Look, this is a democracy.” He took great exception to that, too. I have never seen a crowd that is as partisan, hard nosed and takes no prisoners. You are either with 'em or against 'em.

Q: How much did you get involved in international things. You talk about American airlines. At that time were they looking for international routes?

MOSES: No, at that time there were no overseas routes. The only American flag carriers that flew overseas in the '50's were Pan Am and TWA. American, United, Delta, all flew in the United States. Some had routes to South America. Eastern had some South American

routes. Others may have as well. But the answer is, no, they were not international. My interest was international because of my background; I was from birth interested in international relations. In the '50's, it was the Eisenhower era. I didn't start practice until September of '56. Stevenson was running for the second time against Eisenhower and got clobbered. I think most of the partners in our firm were Democrats. Some very important partners were Republicans. I think the majority of the partners were Democrats, and a vast majority of the associates were Democrats. By the '60 election, I was involved in a minor way with the Kennedy election. But up to that point I wasn't doing anything internationally at all, at least that I can recall. It wasn't until after that.

Q: Was there much of sort of an international representation in the law firms.

MOSES: Yes, Covington had an international law practice. Dean Acheson was the senior partner. A man named John Laylin was a senior partner, not as senior as Mr. Acheson. He was representing Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute. Howard Westwood represented Venezuela in the deportation of Jim#nez. We were representing some mining companies in South America. But other law firms also had well developed international practices. At that time the Washington law practice, the uptown practice, was largely antitrust and dealing with the federal government on behalf of clients outside Washington. More of the international work was done in New York, not Washington.

Q: You mentioned the Jim#nez case. You were involved in that?

MOSES: I was not. Howard Westwood did that.

Q: What was the issue?

MOSES: The issue was whether he would be deported. He was the former dictator of Venezuela. I don't know what the issues were, whether it was the legality of his entry into the United States or the crimes he was charged with in Venezuela that made him subject to deportation, but a lot of bodies at Covington were devoted to the case. Howard brought

in Sid Sachs, a friend of mine, from the DC Bar Association, now dead for 15 years, to help in the trial. Sid was a former assistant U.S. attorney and knew the local bar very well. I was not involved in the Jim#nez deportation case. I didn't handle international matters until much later.

Q: Was he deported?

MOSES: Yes.

Q: You said you did some pro bono work.

MOSES: A great deal.

Q: What sort of pro bono work?

MOSES: At that time Covington assigned associates to spend half time at Legal Aid. Early on in my tenure at Covington, I was spending time at Legal Aid handling whatever matters came over the transom. A lot of it was litigation. I remember trying one interesting matter for a woman named Helen Stevenson. She had been married to a Naval Academy graduate named Stevenson. He died, and she remarried. Her second marriage was annulled, but the second husband died before the statutory appeal period had expired. Her second husband had 30 days to appeal and died on the 29th day. She then applied to receive a pension as the unremarried widow of Stevenson. The Veterans Administration turned her down on grounds that she remarried. The case was before Judge McGuire in the United States District Court. I filed a long brief, something we don't do anymore. The judge decided that she was the unremarried widow of her first husband. One interesting fact I left out: She didn't get the annulment. It was more complicated. The Veterans Administration said she was the widow of her second husband, because the annulment did not become final until the time for taking an appeal had expired or, if an appeal was taken and perfected, until it was decided. I came up with the argument, sort of a nunc pro tunc argument, “now for then.” That he didn't file the appeal, and having not filed an appeal,

there was no intervening event, and once he died, the 30-day period expired and the annulment became final. Judge McGuire agreed with me, but it was a lesson in humility. He didn't pay any attention to my legal arguments. He said, “This isn't fair.” That was the end of it. The assistant U.S. Attorney said, “I agree with you, Judge.” So I won that one, not on the merits, but on the sympathy of the judge.

Then I had another case in juvenile court for a poor fellow that was divorced. He wasn't making any money. I loved the little guy. His wife was running around. She found another guy which was the cause of the divorce. She hauled my guy into Juvenile Court for failure to make support payments. The guy didn't have any money. He was hustling as best he could. He actually put aside a couple of dollars on a sled for his children. In those days you put money down at the store and you paid it off the best you could. I felt so sorry for the fellow. His wife was a no-gooder and he was trying as best he could and working as hard as he could. I argued that case before Marjorie Lawson who was the Juvenile Court judge. Marjorie liked my argument and later got me to work for Kennedy in the 1960 presidential race. She was co-chair of the Minority Rights Committee for Kennedy. She was Afro-American. She and Belford, her husband, were very prominent in the local bar. He was a good trial lawyer. Marjorie was a good political operator and a smart lady. She also persuaded me to represent Bethune College in Florida. Mary Bethune was head of the National Association of Negro Women. This is all from the late 50's or early '60's.

Q: Yeah, during the 50's at this time, how would you describe from sort of the law perspective and the law firm and all, the status of African Americans?

MOSES: As best as I can recall, none of the white firms had Afro-American lawyers. Covington hired its first Afro-American lawyer in the 60's, a man named Tyrone Brown who had gone to Cornell Law School and clerked for Chief Justice Warren. Ty was assigned to work for me. Long before I had asked one of the partners why Covington didn't hire Afro-American lawyers. His response was, “We can't find any qualified Afro-Americans.” The one who would have been qualified, Bill Coleman, who later became Secretary

of Transportation, had been a Supreme Court clerk for Justice Frankfurter. He went to the Gibson Dunn firm after he was Secretary of Transportation. I believe he was later its managing partner. Bill now is in his 80's. But I am not sure Covington went after Bill Coleman. It is a little bit like the George Marshall story. He was asked in the 1960s why the Redskins didn't have any Afro-American football players. He said, “I tried to hire Bobby Mitchell, but the Cleveland Browns wouldn't sell him.” What he did was call the owner of the Browns, Paul Brown, and ask, “Would you sell or trade Bobby Mitchell?” Paul said, “Nothing doing.” That was the extent of his trying. This is when Mitchell was a standout running back for the Cleveland Browns. Bobby later played here. He is a friend of mine, he and his wife Gwen. Then Marshall was gone and the new ownership brought in tons of African American ball players. I guess the great majority of players in the NFL today are African American. But there weren't African American lawyers in white firms in the 50's. There were African American lawyers trying cases, some very good ones. Turkey Thompson who later set up an insurance company here became a Superior Court judge.

Q: Did you feel that the law system as you saw it was fair toward the African Americans or was there a bias? How would you describe it?

MOSES: It is hard to say. I am sure there was bias. The first African American judge in D.C. may have been Marjorie, and she was on the Juvenile Court. There were no African American judges on the federal District Court, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. In the Municipal Court I don't think there were any African American judges except in the Juvenile Court section. That all changed. Aubrey Robinson was one of the early African American judges. He was on the Municipal Court and later became chief judge of the U.S. District Court. There were two or three others. Aubrey, and Bill Bryant. They didn't come to the Municipal Court until the late 50's or early 60's. Later they were both chief judges of the U.S. District Court.

Q: Well then you got involved in the Kennedy campaign. What were you doing and what was your feeling about this, because this was sort of an energizing period, I think, within the body politic.

MOSES: I don't have a clear recollection. First, let me state I traveled with the entourage from Saturday night before the election through the election and on to Hyannisport. The morning after the election I talked with Bobby Kennedy. It was very exciting. I didn't have a real role. The fact is that Marjorie, as a payoff for legal work I had done for her various causes, just put me on the campaign plane. I wasn't assigned to do a thing and I didn't do anything. I had no real involvement in anything other than being an up-close spectator. It was strange. I would have liked to have done things, but didn't sign on early enough to be given responsibility, and in the end it was simply a payoff for things I had done for Marjorie. It was an interesting time. John Kennedy was not the hero he later became. Among the people I knew, he was probably the third choice to be the Democratic candidate, after Chester Bowles and Hubert Humphrey.

Q: He was sort of a lightweight senator wasn't he?

MOSES: He was considered a medium-weight senator, largely a creature of his father's political payoffs and maneuvering. He was known to be ambitious. In the Democratic primaries Kennedy knocked off Humphrey in West Virginia and elsewhere with a lot of brass knuckles and money spreading. The Kennedy's were a tough crowd, a lot tougher than the Ivy League boys that I ran with. A hell of a lot less naive. But I saw all those fellows up close. I saw Kennedy in Watertown, Connecticut at 1:00 in the morning the Sunday before the election. He started giving his talk about Stanley Baldwin, Why England Slept, which was the name of his book. Thousands of people were in the street; it was terrible weather, cold and raining — women with hair curlers. He looked out at the crowd and started laughing at the irony of it all. He was talking about Baldwin in Watertown, Connecticut, an industrial city. People didn't know whom he was talking about. It got to him. Earlier in the day the motorcade headed in the wrong direction on the Long Island

Expressway. Kennedy had his driver stop; he jumped out and went into a gas station to ask for directions to wherever we were going. It was Great Neck or some other place. This was the human part. There were enormous crowds. In Burlington, Vermont, he spoke in a hangar. I was standing next to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. I asked him whether he had foreseen the enthusiastic support. As you know, Arthur Schlesinger is terribly pompous. He said, “Oh yes, blah, blah.” I said to myself, bullshit. But he was a great wordsmith and a preeminent historian. Kennedy wanted his help on speeches.

Q: He seemed to collect an aura of people who were intellectuals, but they seemed to be used as tools.

MOSES: Kennedy? Oh he kept them around as adornments, absolutely. I got to know quite a few of his people. I used to play tennis regularly with Stewart Udall. Stewart stayed on for eight years. Stayed on with Johnson. I got to know Stewart very well.

Q: He was Secretary of the Interior.

MOSES: Yes. He was from Arizona, and a good Secretary of the Interior. I worked with him on saving Merrywood, Jackie Kennedy's ancestral home, when the Auchincloss family sold it to a developer for a high-rise apartment. I came up with the notion of placing a scenic easement on the property; Stewart Udall agreed. The scenic easement blocked high-rises. Then I got the Internal Revenue Service to rule that persons who donated scenic easements could take a tax deduction for the value of the easement. The neighbors around Merrywood did this. The story was on the front page of The Wall Street Journal — not my name but the ruling I had obtained for my client, one of the neighbors. I went to the Hill to testify on scenic easements. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr. was on the committee. So I was playing at a low level with some interesting issues.

Q: What was your feeling about Robert Kennedy and his operation at the time?

MOSES: Fact be known, most of the people I knew had a low opinion of Bobby. We remembered him from his McCarthy days. He was on McCarthy's staff headed by Roy Cohn. We thought Cohn was lower than a snake.

Q: Robert Kennedy, they were nasty.

MOSES: They were very nasty. And they were chewing up people who couldn't defend themselves given the setting, many of whom had flirted with or had indeed been involved with the Communist Party 10, 15, 20 years before. They were pretty much hopeless, helpless knaves. Bobby was very acerbic, very tough, as was Cohn who turned out to be a dastardly figure, a smart guy, but a real bastard. He sent shock waves through this town and through the country. So the opinion of Bobby was lower than the opinion of his brother which was not very high either. That all changed. Bobby became Attorney General which shocked everybody. The consensus was it was a bad appointment. He wasn't qualified and being the President's brother raised all kinds of issues, but he turned out to be a stellar Attorney General. He brought in a first class team of assistant attorneys general, and switched from being a very tough prosecutor to being a person committed to the underclass in America. Was it genuine or was it political convenience? Who's to say?

Q: I always had a hard time reconciling this. I never warmed up to the warm lovable Bobby Kennedy.

MOSES: I don't think he was ever warm and lovable. He was always a tough guy, but he inspired great loyalty. He and Ethel. Ethel was tougher than he. She is still alive and living not far from us. She was as tough as could be. But their public persona was rather magical, as was John Kennedy's.

Q: Yeah, I mean it continues to this day.

MOSES: Well, John Kennedy wasn't as good a president as his image. We now know that he was very much handicapped by Addison's Disease, a lot of pain. He spent gobs of time

chasing women. Robert Kennedy called one woman secretary in our firm asking if she would go out with his brother, Jack, who had seen her on television. She said she turned it down. Whether the story was true or not true I don't know. She was a beautiful woman. She was a niece of Tris Speaker who had been an outfielder for the Cleveland Indians and who gave us the memorable phrase about Walter Johnson, the “Big Train,” who pitched for the Washington Senators in the 1920's. His line was, “You can't hit 'em if you can't see 'em.”

Q: As you got further along into the 60's, did you find that politics began to, did you get more involved in politics?

MOSES: Yes, race was the big issue in the 60's. It was the major domestic issue. I went to the first swearing in of the second chairman of the EEOC, a friend, Stephen Shulman. Johnson spoke. He wasn't impressive, but there it was in the Roosevelt Room in the White House. I was very much involved in what we thought was important work in the Afro-American community, the black community. I was president of Hospitality House which was almost entirely Afro-American. We were pushing very hard.

Q: Well did you feel that the law establishment was a tough nut to crack as far as here in Washington? I mean Washington was probably more southern than most southern cities as far as...

MOSES: First of all, I was at Covington & Burling, probably the most prestigious law firm in Washington. So I was starting out at a great advantage. Whatever I did in terms of civil rights was done at little cost to me. I don't deserve much credit. It wasn't a sacrifice of income or anything else. I enjoyed doing it; I believed in it, but it wasn't at my personal sacrifice. The local schools were desegregated right after Brown vs. Board of Education in 1954.

Q: That was around '54.

MOSES: '54. The restaurants I think, were desegregated at the same time, but there certainly was no equality. I don't believe there were any Afro-American families living in white neighborhoods other than Georgetown which had a lot of Afro-Americans living there 80 to 100 years before. But the only Afro-American families that remained when I lived there were remnants of emancipated slaves. They had extremely modest homes. A lot of churches were Afro-American, still are, but the congregations had moved across town. We moved to Virginia in 1960; it was the same thing. The persons who had come to Virginia in the preceding 20 or 30 years and lived in more affluent sections of McLean were all white. There were black families, but they lived in areas that were exclusively black; they had been there for 100 years or more. I tried to register them to vote which was thought to be a big thing. I would go house-to-house and ask them if they had registered. Many of them hadn't. They were very proud people. I think some of them were educated; certainly their children were educated. They lived in their communities far longer than we had.

Q: Well as we are moving into the 60's and all, did you get involved in sort of the international wing of either the law or the political process?

MOSES: Never did in law. I haven't until this day other than to represent businesses abroad, and a few individuals. I represented lots of businesses that were multinational or located abroad. That just evolved over time. However, I did become increasingly involved in Middle East issues in the 70's.

Q: I was wondering, going up to the 60's and 50's, what about Jewish issues, and this would move into Israel and all that?

MOSES: Well, the springboard for everything I have done in the international field was my organizational affiliation in the Jewish community. I was chair of the Washington chapter of the American Jewish Committee in the late 60's. I was in my 30's. The national president was Arthur Goldberg. I used that as a springboard to become increasingly involved in Middle East affairs, Israel-related issues, and refugee issues. That is what got me to

Romania. That is how I became ambassador to Romania two decades later. I also chaired the committee on behalf of the organized Jewish community that negotiated with the Business Roundtable on the law passed by the Congress making it illegal for Americans to participate in the boycott of Israel. I testified in the House and Senate. As I said, I chaired the negotiating committee on behalf of the organized Jewish community. There were three of us: Max Kampelman who later was Counselor at the Department of State, and Paul Berger, a Washington lawyer. Max was our leader.

Q: I have interviewed him.

MOSES: Max's book mentions that this was probably the springboard for his later being named chair of the U.S. Delegation to the Helsinki Talks. He wasn't the original chair; he was co-chair, but he ended up being chair when Griffin Bell, former Attorney General under Carter, resigned.

Q: A prominent figure during the Watergate hearings wasn't he?

MOSES: No, I don't think so. He was a judge on the Fifth Circuit and then Attorney General. He had resigned for personal reasons and gone back to Atlanta. Carter appointed him chair of the Helsinki Delegation; Max was number two. Max really went to work, was effective, and I think Judge Bell acquiesced to Max's de facto leadership, and after a time resigned. I am quite sure there was no friction. Our effort in opposing the Arab Boycott is how I first met Paul Sarbanes and started working with him. I met with a lot of the key figures in the Senate and the House and the White House. I started before Carter was elected. I originally was involved in '75 when Elliot Richardson was Secretary of Commerce, Bill Simon was at Treasury and Kissinger at State.

Q: How did you feel during the Nixon time?

MOSES: I loathed Nixon. I thought he was an absolute scoundrel, unbalanced, a mean-spirited scoundrel that was Machiavellian, mentally unsteady. He was a very strange guy. In retrospect, everything he did was not bad.

Q: No. God, compared to what is happening today.

MOSES: In his domestic agenda he was fairly liberal. I don't know whether he believed in it or whether he thought it was politically expedient. His main interest was foreign policy. He had Pat Moynihan for a time as his domestic policy advisor. Moynihan was a carryover from Rockefeller days. Both Kissinger and Moynihan started with Rockefeller. Kissinger became a complete chameleon. I don't know whom I trusted less, Nixon or Kissinger. Kissinger may have been the worst Secretary of State in the history of the Republic.

Q: One of the great problems was he didn't let people know what he was doing.

MOSES: Oh, he was purposefully devious. He enjoyed hiding the ball. He wouldn't let anyone else share the glory. He wanted to get involved in anything that had any profile, but he screwed it up starting with SALT I. What else? The negotiations with the Viet Cong could have ended the war in '68, but it was he or Anna Chennault (Mrs. Claire Chennault) who told Viet Nam President Nguyen Van Thieu he would get a better deal from the Republicans than President Johnson was offering. Thieu pulled out of the negotiations. It took five years to negotiate the deal with the Viet Cong. Tens of thousands of American boys were killed. We ended up with a national disaster. D#tente was a mistake. Kissinger never understood the moral superiority of the West and the fragility of the communist world. He wanted to create a Metternichian balance of power in Europe. He failed to see (or at least acknowledge) the atrophy that had occurred in the Soviet Union. Stalin had killed many would-have-been future leaders, repressed dissent, devastated agriculture and set the Soviet empire on a course that could only lead to economic and political stagnation. Even in Kissinger's day, the handwriting was on the wall. Brezhnev was desperately trying to hold the pieces together. Communist

theology had become empty slogans, a mantra chanted, but not believed. Uprisings in East Germany in 1953, Budapest in 1956, and Prague in 1969 made it clear that, given the chance, countries under Soviet occupation would bolt. Kissinger wanted to keep the lid on, not risk confrontation with the Soviet Union. He came up with the wonderful phrase “organic links” between the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as a way to stabilize the region. He was simply dreadful.

Q: Also on the Helsinki accords, since he had not initiated them, I didn't realize this sort of ended up as the key that helped to really change the whole relationship.

MOSES: He had an enormous ego. Remember his convoluted way of speaking and his profundity? People gave him credit for knowledge and sagacity, sort of like Alan Greenspan.

Q: Well during this time as you were involved with Jewish organizations, did you see a change or a split or something between, you know at one point I think almost everybody in the United States thought Israel was great and all this, and the Palestinians were sort of a peripheral group and all. It took quite awhile before all of a sudden the realization came that there was something else. They were also people with aspirations.

MOSES: It is more complicated than that if you will permit me. Early on, Israel was not held in high regard in this country. The government was thought to be socialist, and it was. The country was thought to be largely non-religious, and it was, and its mere existence was considered by the foreign policy establishment to be contrary to our interests. Truman's decision to recognize Israel, which historians can argue about, I would like to think was taken for humanitarian reasons, not political reasons. Goodness knows, at one time or another he stuck his thumb in the eyes of everybody in this country including organized labor. He went to the Hill to draft the railroad workers into the army. He took on John L. Lewis; he took on virtually everyone. He was a feisty guy. He made the decision largely because six million Jews had been killed in the Holocaust, and he

believed Jews deserved a country of their own. As you know, once he made a decision there was no looking back. The relationship between Israel and the Truman Administration in the ensuing four years was not close. Truman recognized Israel's independence, de facto in '48; he was in office until January of '53. During that period the prime minister of Israel never visited the White House. This coolness continued under Eisenhower, particularly with the Suez War. The British and French, together with Israel, clobbered Egypt. Eisenhower ordered the Israelis to pull out of the Sinai in February of '56. The issue in those days was not the Palestinians; it was more the Arab world, our friendship with the Saudis and others. People in Washington had a real chip on their shoulder regarding Israel. The State Department crowd was very frosty towards Israel. I remember former Assistant Secretary of State Lucius Battle telling me in '82 when Israel invaded Lebanon, “Tell your soldiers to get out of there.” “OK, Luke, what do I tell, the Marines, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy?” He said, “No, you tell your Israeli soldiers.” I said, “Luke, you are confused. I am American.” I think he was anti-Semitic.

Q: Well I think it was more than that. I mean there were other things because you know I think it has often been put that the people who are involved in middle eastern affairs went there for love of Arab. It was maybe a career thing.

MOSES: Sure it was career driven, but there was also resentment. State always felt that Truman recognized Israel for political purposes over the objection of General Marshall who was Secretary of State at the time.

Q: I think he was Secretary of State at the time. If I recall it was that, and Marshall said you shouldn't do it.

MOSES: Marshall said, “I am not sure I can support you in the '48 election if you recognize Israel.” That was really something, but the President, being the guy he was, called it the way he saw it. But there was resentment. By the 60's when AIPAC was operating effectively on the Hill, there was the sense that Congressional interference negatively

impacted U.S. foreign policy. The attitude at State was, “We decide what U.S. foreign policy should be.” A decade later, Zbigniew Brzezinski, then National Security Advisor, was interviewed by the Kuwaiti press. He was asked, in effect, would American foreign policy be different if it weren't for the influence of the Jewish community in the Congress. Zbig answered, “I can't answer that question. What you are really asking me is would American foreign policy be different if we were not a democracy. The answer is yes, it would be different if we weren't a democracy, but we are a democracy.” That was a great answer. But I heard all during this period that Jews were using their political influence to twist and bend American foreign policy in favor of Israel.

Q: I know I sat in two countries where I watched political influence come. One was Yugoslavia with the Croats basically Catholic, basically exerting a lot of pressure.

MOSES: Well Tito was a Croat.

Q: The other one was in Greece where the Greek Americans on Cyprus and everything else.

MOSES: Oh, no question. When we get there, I will tell you about it. Sure. But I think your question is when did the country come to realize that the crux of the issue was the Palestinians and their aspirations. That was clearly recognized by 1976 with the Brookings Report that Bill Quandt wrote. Carter took that as his bible. That is the policy he followed until Sadat went to Jerusalem in November, 1977. So the recognition that the issue was Palestinian-Israeli was clearly postulated in '76 with the Brookings Report.

Q: How did you find within I mean how did this impact on you? Did you find this a report that made sense in the...

MOSES: It made sense up to a point. It was written by Bill and others, but primarily Bill. His wife is Palestinian. The issue was Palestinian-Israeli. But the Palestinian leader was Arafat, and he turned out to be an unreliable interlocutor and negotiator. I was on the

White House lawn in August '93 when Arafat signed the Oslo Accords with Rabin and Peres. I would not shake Arafat's hand. He had ordered the murder of the American ambassador in Khartoum and the Station Chief. A dastardly person. But Clinton was always forgiving. Being a great politician, he realized you had to deal with Arafat or no one.

Q: Well to come back, my question was at the time, how did you find it because it had changed quite a bit. APAC, the American...

MOSES: AIPAC, the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee, was started in the 50's by Si Kenen, who was effective on the Hill, a good lobbyist. Initially, AIPAC had some non-Jewish board members. Over time it has made an enormous difference. The first visit by a prime minister to the White House was by Eschol in 1964 when Johnson was President. The first American military planes sold to Israel were under Kennedy. A far bigger sale took place under Johnson after the Six Day War when we sold Phantoms to Israel. Rabin was here then as ambassador. He had a great deal of influence, particularly with the U.S. military which traditionally had been anti-Israel. It is entirely different today. There were no Jews of influence in the upper echelons of State or DOD. Ironically both Nixon's Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State were Jewish by birth. Kissinger was almost a Jewish apologist. He certainly made it difficult for Israel. Indeed, during the Yom Kippur War, until the President intervened, Kissinger's policy was to let Israel bleed. Then it would have to come to him and he would be able to control the situation. Very Machiavellian.

Q: This is tape 2 side 1 with Alfred Moses.

MOSES: He had no affinity with the Jewish community.

Q: This is Schlesinger.

MOSES: He was Secretary of Defense. He had no affinity with the Jewish community. He had converted to the Lutheran faith while at Harvard. Nor did Kissinger despite the fact that his father was Orthodox and he grew up in an Orthodox home. He divorced his

first wife who was Jewish. His second wife, Nancy, is not Jewish. Most of the people of influence in the DOD, both in uniform and non-uniform, were at best frosty towards Israel. AIPAC changed this through its ability to rally support on the Hill, particularly in the Senate. When Kissinger went to Israel in September 1975 and talked about a “reassessment,” there was a letter from 96 senators saying, “No, Mr. Secretary.” So the political hammer was quite influential with the Ford Administration and with succeeding administrations. Every president knows there are limits as to how far he can go without running into a major fight on the Hill.

Q: Well then did you get involved with the Nixon administration much?

MOSES: No. I never laid eyes on Richard Nixon. I was in the White House under Johnson and Ford. I was close to Phil Buchen, Ford's counsel. The Ford Administration was wonderful to work with. I met with President Ford on several occasions. But Nixon, no.

Q: Erlichman and Haldeman?

MOSES: Never. I worked with the White House counsel's office when I was representing the Kennedy Center. Leonard Garment in the Nixon White House was enormously helpful to me on Kennedy Center matters. I had no dealings with the Nixon Administration on behalf of the Jewish community. I didn't become active until the Ford years in terms of speaking to the White House, going up on the Hill, for Jewish causes.

Q: What about the Carter administration came in from the election of '76 but came in in '77. Did that engage you?

MOSES: Yes. I chaired the negotiations with the Business Roundtable on the anti-Arab Boycott legislation on behalf of a broad coalition of Jewish organizations and was at the White House frequently garnering support for the agreement we struck with the Business Roundtable. Commerce and State were opposed; they were still operating under the Ford Administration's script.

Q: This is on what issue now?

MOSES: The legislation countering the Arab Boycott of Israel, the secondary and tertiary boycotts that applied to any company that did business with Israel or that did business with a company that did business with Israel. An office of the Arab League sent questionnaires to companies doing business primarily in Saudi Arabia. The legislation made it illegal for an American company to respond to that questionnaire.

Q: Well this was done by the Arab league.

MOSES: Correct.

Q: I remember I was amused. This goes quite a ways back. I was in Dhahran as a vice counsel and found out that IBM had a, this is the days of card sorting, not computers, and had a card sorting outfit, a small one in Israel. So they were going to boycott IBM. The Egyptians said, "Wait a minute. Our entire military mobilization scheme is based on the IBM cards. We can't do this." Did it seem to be an effective boycott or not?

MOSES: It is hard to say. It certainly discouraged doing business with Israel and investing in Israel, even doing business with companies that did business in Israel, depending on the company's clout. They didn't want to take on an IBM, but smaller businesses, sure. I testified at the Congressional hearings in the House and Senate. So did a spokesman for Dresser Industries who said, " We don't comply with the boycott, but we think it is bad legislation because the Saudis will react negatively, and hurt U.S. businesses." "All business-related legislation," Senator Sarbanes replied, "has some impact on business, starting with the Social Security Act. Moreover, if you are not complying with the boycott, what difference does it make to Dresser?" Dresser's spokesman did not answer. Not all businesses were opposed. General Mills supported the legislation solely as a matter of principle; they thought the boycott was wrong. I immediately went out and bought General Mills stock.

Q: Well did you run into conflict with sort of equivalent of another ideological boycott, and that is Communist, dealings with communist countries?

MOSES: That was a different issue, but I was involved with getting MFN, most favored nation treaty status for Romania in the late 70's and early 80's. That was controversial, but the Reagan Administration was on my side. We used the legislation to get Jews out of Romania. Its status was up for renewal every year, and if the Jewish community had opposed it, it wouldn't have passed. We fought very hard. I had a two-day meeting in Washington over a July 4 weekend in 1979 when that was the issue. Romania sent a special emissary, its former ambassador to the United States, Cornelia Bogdan. We pushed him very hard. We ended up with an agreement so that any Jew who wanted to leave Romania could leave. A list of Jews applying would be given to the Chief Rabbi and he, in turn, gave it to me. We were equally effective on boycott matters. But Jewish emigration from Romania did not touch at all on what I was doing on the Arab Boycott.

Q: Well this is your first real contact on the Romanian issue?

MOSES: I went to Romania in '76 on my way back from Israel. Young people came up to me on the street asking me to help get them out. I did that until Ceausescu fell in '89, 13 years later. That brought me in contact with a lot of people such as Zbig Brzezinski who was then in the White House; he was very helpful. I met with Carter's counsel, Bob Lipshutz, who was also helpful. In the 80's I worked closely with Roz Ridgeway, Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs. Mark Palmer was then the regional director at State and later ambassador to Hungary. Tom Simons, a few years later our ambassador to Poland, also pitched in, as did Martin Wenick. Whenever I asked to come over, State was receptive. It was the same earlier at the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) when Hal Saunders was Assistant Secretary. I met with him regularly. Also his predecessor, Roy Atherton. Hal asked me to write the first draft of what became the Camp David Accords. It was an amazing time.

Q: What was your impression of the whole Camp David negotiations?

MOSES: It was a bit surreal. For 13 days Sadat and Begin did not talk to each other except the first day and the last. Carter did the shuttling. Saunders did most of the drafting. He came out with a marvelous document. I later met with Sadat in 1980 in his home in Mit Abul Kom in the Nile delta. His only regret was that, in his words, Begin did not have the courage to go on with the Palestinian part of the Accords. The Camp David Accords had two parts. One, Egyptian-Israeli, the other Palestinian-Israeli, that called for Palestinian autonomy. Begin signed the document that recognized “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.” He went quite far. It did not call for an independent Palestinian state as our policy is today, but it was the first recognition by Israel of the political right of the Palestinians to govern themselves. Sadat was the most impressive public figure I ever met. He was a true visionary and a strategic thinker. It was he, not Kissinger, who orchestrated the disengagement agreements in the Sinai preceding his visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. Two weeks after Sadat was assassinated, I visited Cairo to meet with Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's successor. Mubarak reaffirmed Egypt's commitment to carry out the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, which was important in itself, but in other respects he seemed wooden, lacking Sadat's forcefulness and charisma. From Cairo I went to Jerusalem to meet with Prime Minister Begin who talked at length about Sadat's funeral. The funeral was on a Saturday and, in order to observe the Sabbath, Begin arrived Friday afternoon. He stayed in what he termed “Egyptian army barracks.” Lowering his eyes and wrinkling his nose, he said they were “filthy.” He then proceeded to recount his walking in the funeral procession and having Sadat's son came up, kiss him on both cheeks and tell him, “I consider you my father.” A week or two later I was talking with President Carter who also attended the funeral. He told me what moved him most was when Sadat's son came up to him, kissed him on both cheeks and told him, “I consider you my father.” How many fathers can one person have?

Q: Of course at that time we still had sort of the Palestinians with Arafat. They were very difficult.

MOSES: Indeed they were. Arafat had been kicked out of Jordan. He went to Lebanon where he remained until '82, when the U.S. took him by ship to Tunisia. The issue then as now is whether the Israelis should have stayed in the territories occupied in the Six Day War. Following the war, there was a major debate within the Israeli government. Some wanted to withdraw immediately in return for an end to the conflict. But Arafat and the Arab World could not accept the humiliating defeat of the '67 War. A few months later, in Khartoum, they came up with the three “No's” — No negotiation, No peace, No recognition. That killed it until today. Had the Arabs been willing to negotiate and recognize Israel, the Israelis would have withdrawn in '67.

Q: Unfortunately that whole very sad situation is full of lost opportunities.

MOSES: Lost opportunities, but the Israelis were responsible too, including Sharon. He pushed the settlements. He was the major architect of the settlement policy. The Labor government was much more circumspect. Initially, Labor called for settlements along the Jordan River and in the Jordan Valley, but not elsewhere. Sharon supported the illegal settlements that in time became legal. I think his disengagement plan today for Gaza is the wrong approach. What he should do is dismantle the illegal settlements on the West Bank. Forget about Gaza until there is formal agreement. Israel needs to be a country of law and order. The settlers in Gaza are there legally. The government put them there.

Q: The Romanian connection, how did this, I mean were you acting sort of on your own or was there...

MOSES: On my own. I first went to Romania as a vice president of the American Jewish Committee, but later I was on my own. I was in Washington; I was an activist, and I started pushing to get Jews out of Romania, individual cases got solved. In this I enlisted the

support of the administration. Brzezinski agreed to put Jewish emigration in Carter's talking points for his meeting with Ceausescu in '78. Ceausescu said it was a domestic issue, but Carter wisely replied, “No it isn't; it affects the relationship between our two countries.” Ceausescu was not one to negotiate. He was very difficult.

Q: Did you get involved with Ceausescu?

MOSES: I met with him three times.

Q: What was your impression of him?

MOSES: I thought he was vastly overrated. I couldn't understand how he wielded the power he did. He was physically unimpressive, flabby and short. He didn't exert any sense of power or stature. The first time I met him was at the Waldorf Towers. He was wearing a blue serge suit. I guess all communists wore blue serge suits in those days. I met him again in Predeal, Romania in January 1980, a two-hour meeting. I still have my notes of the meeting. He just harangued; he was incapable of saying anything profound. He thought he was far more important than he was. He took credit for the Sadat/Begin meeting which neither Begin nor Sadat thought he deserved. Sadat did ask Ceausescu if Begin was reliable and did he have the strength to be effective. Ceausescu answered affirmatively. Whether that influenced his later decision to go to Jerusalem, I doubt. Sadat indicated to me it did not. I think Ceausescu's intervention was of no real importance.

Q: In the 70's when you got involved, what was as you saw it the plight of the Romanian Jews?

MOSES: Jews in Romania had been tossed out of everything. Originally there was some Jewish, very prominent Jewish involvement in the communist movement in Central and Eastern Europe. But after the Slansky trial, in '52 in Prague, Jews were systematically thrown out of governments in Central and Eastern Europe. Stalin was an anti-Semite. He had liquidated the Jewish leaders Trotsky, Zinoviev and others. Molotov was married to a

Jewish woman. Stalin used to needle Molotov about his Jewish wife. Kaganovich survived, I don't know how. After the “doctor's trial” in '49 in Leningrad, Stalin turned on the Jews. What happened was that “national communism” took over and nationalists in the region were historically anti-Semitic.

Q: Did this reflect directly on Romania? I mean was the communist movement, the Romanians had a reputation as being anti Semitic stemming from WWII.

MOSES: The Iron Guard was virulently anti-Semitic. Later 150,000 Romanian Jews in Transnistra were murdered in '41 and '42 under Antonescu. We can go into that if you wish. But later these communist despots, once ideology went by the wayside, fell back on nativism to buttress their regimes. Ceausescu was typical. In ways obvious and not so obvious, he encouraged anti-Semitism or certainly let loose forces of anti-Semitism. Jews who had had prominent government positions were thrown out, starting with Ana Pauker. This was before Ceausescu was in power. So by the time I got there in '76, Jews who had been in government were unemployed. Some had been falsely charged with crimes. One man I met, who had been in the foreign service, was accused of padding his expense account, and he probably did. Everybody did because the official allowance was not sufficient to eat or get a hotel room. This was well known. But this man went to prison. I later helped get him out of the country. Conditions were very difficult.

Q: I thought we would sort of finish up this part and then I would let you free.

MOSES: I enjoy this. Your questions have been superb. I am sort of skipping around in my answers so I am not sure it is coherent.

Q: Well at the end you will have a chance to reorganize it. You will get the thing and it will be on a disk and it can be put in. We are raising a bunch of issues. On the, there are two sides. One is to get the legislation in the United States. You were saying you had the president and Congress and all.

MOSES: The original MFN legislation was in '75 before I became active. I didn't pick up on it until '76-'77. I had nothing to do with the original MFN legislation granting Romania most favored nation treaty status on a year-to-year basis. That preceded my involvement. I became active in the annual renewals.

Q: Well I know in the 60's I was in Yugoslavia where that was...

MOSES: Romania did not get MFN until '75 or '76. This was during the Ford Administration.

Q: Well was there any particular resistance on the part of the Romanians or were they out to get some money, so much per head?

MOSES: Romania sold its Jews to Israel for $2,000 a head, but I did not know this until after Ceausescu fell. They were selling their Germans for $2,000 or $2,500 a head. Chancellor Kohl greatly resented the Romanian hold-up. Even after Ceausescu was gone, he strongly distrusted Romania.

Q: Well Hitler did a certain amount of selling in his early days.

MOSES: I think he did.

Q: ...of Jews before he turned completely nasty. I mean he couldn't have been more, but there was a selling process.

MOSES: I was very naive. The Israelis would come to see me. I still remember their names. They never let on at all that this was going on. I should have been a lot smarter than I was.

Q: Well what sort of arguments could you advance, saying this would be better relations or what?

MOSES: I never defended the Ceausescu regime. The one time I testified on the Hill I said that the situation in Romania was “horrible,” my exact words. Unlike others, I never said anything positive about Ceausescu. What I said was that under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which was the legislation in issue, Romania's Jews had the right to emigrate, and therefore, however deplorable the situation in Romania, MFN was the one lever we had to get Jews, and others, out. We were able to do precisely this. I helped a Christian minister get out of Romania. He now has a church in Northern Virginia. I helped another minister who had been put in jail for distributing Bibles. I was also able to get the official Baptist translation of the Bible printed in Romania. I could not have done this without MFN. In retrospect, was it the right policy? I don't know. Successive administrations, including the Reagan Administration, supported what I was doing largely because they saw Ceausescu as someone independent from the Soviet Union. Romania was not a member of the Warsaw Military Pact. The United States may also have been getting some intelligence from the Romanians, but if we did, it was probably not worth a damn.

Q: Was the issue about Romanian Jews going to Israel because so many of these headed about the time when something like 50% of anybody who got out of the Soviet Union ended up going to Austria and then heading for the States?

MOSES: That wasn't true of Romania's Jews. They chiefly headed for Israel. From the Soviet Union they went to Austria, and then to Italy, where about half went to the United States and half to Israel. That was not true of Romanian Jewry. They went directly from Bucharest to Israel.

Q: Was that, I mean there were flights that took them right in.

MOSES: Absolutely.

Q: So there was no sort of choice as...

MOSES: They got their visas for Israel. They flew on TAROM and El Al planes. There was air traffic between Tel Aviv and Bucharest.

Q: Did you get any feeling at the time for the assimilation of the Romanian Jews into the body politic or whatever it is.

MOSES: In Israel? Romanian Jews are very prominent in Israel. At one point it was probably the second largest ethnic community. About 400,000 Romanian Jews ended up in Israel. There was a larger emigration from Morocco in the 50's. Later Russian Jews came in even larger numbers. Many people in prominent positions in Israel were born in Romania. Two former ambassadors here, Meir Rosenne and Moshe Arad, were born in Romania. Mendy Meron, a former Israeli military attach# here, was born in Romania. There are scores of Israelis of prominence born in Romania. Romanian Jews have not been disadvantaged. They have been quite successful.

Q: Were they coming, the Romanian Jews, I am talking about the time you were working on this. Were they coming from any particular sector of...

MOSES: About half the Jews lived in Bucharest, the other half outside the capital. The numbers going to Israel were proportionate to where the Jews lived.

Q: What about professions?

MOSES: That's harder to say. Most Romanian Jews by the mid 70's were well educated, because the Romanian populace as a whole was well educated.

Q: In other words we are not talking about a farming population.

MOSES: No, to the contrary. We are talking about people who were either tradesmen, business people or professional people. A lot of engineers, some lawyers, some doctors.

Romanians under the communists were well educated, less so before the communists took over. Jews traditionally were much better educated than the general public.

Q: They hadn't had the ghettoization?

MOSES: No, but there were Jewish neighborhoods in Bucharest, and Jews were overly represented in proportion to their numbers in the professions, medicine, law.

Q: You didn't have this, you know, we think of Fiddler on the Roof and all that, these small little shtetls.

MOSES: Well the worst ones were shtetls. I visited some of them. But by the mid 70's they were pretty well gone. The Jews had been urbanized. That wasn't true in the years before. It was true by the time I got there. The Jewish shtetls that I visited were Dorohoi and a few others. It was just a remnant of the Jewish community of yesteryear.

Q: Did you get involved in any of the other nationalities? You mentioned the Germans and Kohl. What about the Hungarians?

MOSES: Not before I was ambassador. When I was ambassador I did a lot with the Hungarian community. Before that, I didn't even know the Hungarian community except for a few members of the Congress such as Congressman Schultz from Pennsylvania who was quite active on behalf of ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Schultz was a member of a CODEL to Romania in 1980. I was there. The CODEL went right from the plane to the chief rabbi's office. First they asked the rabbi about discrimination against Hungarians. The rabbi said, “I am only a rabbi. That is not something I can respond to, but if you asked me personally, I don't think there is discrimination.” He was Romanian; he had come from Moldavia and probably shared the general Romanian feeling about ethnic Hungarians.

Q: Was there any at the time Moldavia was part of the Soviet Union.

MOSES: This is Moldavia which is one of the original two Romanian principalities, Wallachia and Moldavia. Many Jews lived in Moldavia. Former Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen was from Moldavia. But this is not to be confused with Moldova, the present Republic of Moldova. Its capital is Chisinau.

Q: Well then after the Carter administration left, the Reagan Administration came in. maybe this might be a good place to stop. So we will pick this up.

Q: What were you doing in the White House?

MOSES: Special advisor/Special Counsel to the president. I was lead counsel to the President in the Billygate Hearings.

Q: OK, do you want to talk a little about the Billygate?

MOSES: Sure.

Q: Ok. Why don't we stop and put at the end here let's talk about your time in the White House of the Carter administration, and your impressions of how it was, the atmosphere and the Billygate thing, and President Carter not just in foreign affairs but as an administrator.

MOSES: I knew him as a person. For a time we were quite close. I think he thought I had pulled a rabbit out of the hat for him in the Billygate Hearings.

Q: All right so we will talk about it is kind of hard. We have really forgotten about Billygate, but we will come back to Billygate. Everybody has to have a brother.OK today is May 3, 2005. So you were in the Carter administration as what was the job?

MOSES: Special advisor to the President. In the Billygate matter I was special counsel.

Q: What were the dates, I mean the years?

MOSES: Not years. I was there only eight or nine months. I started in April 1980 and left the White House on Inauguration Day, January 20, 1981.

Q: Well that would be January 20, 1981. What does it mean special advisor or special counsel?

MOSES: I succeeded my friend Ed Sanders. He had the title of Senior Advisor to the President with an office in the State Department on the seventh floor, and originally in the East Wing of the White House. He had come a year or two before but then returned to California because of his wife's health. He originally proposed to remain, working part time, but Hamilton Jordan, Carter's Chief of Staff, nixed this. Sol Linowitz, Carter's special emissary for the Panama Canal Treaty, along with Stu Eizenstat and Lloyd Cutler, White House Counsel, met to decide on Ed's successor. I was told one of them said they needed someone like Al Moses whereupon someone else said, “Why don't we call Al.” Ed did call me. I went over, was interviewed, and got the job. Once on the job, I quickly discovered the office was a mess. Ed left no records to speak of, and his staff was a hodgepodge of cast-offs from other White House offices with no particular knowledge or experience in Jewish affairs, including Israel. The one exception was Marvin Feuerwerger, who had been Ed's principal assistant and who today holds a high position in AIPAC. A short time after I arrived at the White House, Ham Jordan called me to his office. Ham was usually light and breezy, but not this time. He had a deep scowl on his face and, after seating me in a chair opposite his desk, proceeded to tell me in solemn tones that, as I undoubtedly knew, Marvin was the subject of a security investigation. This came as a bolt out of the blue. (Ed Sanders knew about this before he left the White House but did not tell me. This was consistent with his not telling me generally about his staff or work. He consistently brushed off my questions, saying I knew all I needed to know, a vast overstatement.) Returning to Marvin, Jordan recounted a bizarre tale involving Hal Saunders, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and a friend of mine. The supposed security breach involved talking points for Bob Strauss, the President's Special Envoy to the Middle

East, on a visit to Israel some months previously. The talking points had been leaked in advance to Wolf Blitzer, later CNN's Chief Diplomatic Correspondent. Marvin and Wolf were long-time friends and, according to Ham, on this basis Hal fingered Marvin as the probable source of the leak. When I met with Marvin, he denied this, but it was too late. Marvin was gone from the White House, landing a job at the Pentagon with his security clearance fully intact, as it should have been. Many months later Wolf Blitzer told me that the source of the leak was none other than Hal Saunders. This was my first, but not last, exposure to hardball Washington-style. Hal had apparently fingered Marvin to save himself. In other respects Hal was helpful to me. He went out of his way to include me in high-level discussions on Middle East issues including visits to Washington by Israeli and Arab leaders. By way of contrast, Sol Linowitz, who had persuaded President Carter and others to bring me to the White House, was anything but friendly. I never figured out whether it was territorial on Sol's part in not wanting another Jew involved in the Peace Process or whether it was just the way he went about his business. The greatest favor Hal Saunders did for me was to send Marc Grossman from State to be my assistant at the White House. Marc was then a junior foreign service officer but was already stamped by Hal and others at State for success. He lived up to his billings. He went on to become Executive Secretary at State, U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Director General of the Foreign Service and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the highest career position in the department. Marc and I quickly became close personal friends and have remained so. He educated me on the ways of the State Department that would stand me in good stead when I became ambassador to Romania. He became ambassador to Turkey at the same time. We were classmates in the State Department's three-week course for new ambassadors. I needed the education much more than Marc. Two other assistants eventually joined Marc and me. One was Mark Ginsberg who in the 1990s was the U.S. ambassador to Morocco; the other was Ralph Grunewald who is now serving as the Executive Vice President of Hillel. They both brought to the White House genuine enthusiasm and deep knowledge of the Jewish community. Over the ensuing months we also attracted a number of young volunteers, one of whom

was Debbie White who was just starting college. She later earned a Ph.D. from Columbia University and is now teaching. Another intern, Evan Bloom, was acknowledged by all to be brilliant. He became a lawyer, joined the distinguished Washington law firm of Arnold & Porter and is now at State. Later when I became Special Counsel to the President in the Billygate Hearings, Zo# Baird came to the counsel's office from Justice. Twelve years later, Zo# was President Clinton's first choice to be Attorney General, but when her confirmation ran into a buzz saw in the Senate over the nanny issue, she withdrew her name.

Transcriber's note: We had a lengthy dropout on tape two beginning on the last third of side one and continuing through the first two thirds of side two. The levels were so low as to render the program unintelligible. I will pick up the transcription on the last third of side two, tape two, where Ambassador Moses becomes audible again.

MOSES: After his father died, Jimmy resigned from the Navy and returned to Plains, Georgia, to run his father's peanut business. Billy greatly resented it. He had been working with his father all those years when Jimmy was in the Navy. When Jimmy returned, Billy stormed out of the office and drove a front-end loader with a full load of peanuts right into a tree. He was so mad that his brother was taking over the family business. This was what Jimmy told me.

Q: Yeah. He had been a naval officer and came back.

MOSES: Jimmy is a tough fellow. He is bright but also demanding with a very high performance standard and a moral sense of rectitude. None of this went down well with Billy.

Q: Yeah. At one point they even had something called Billy Brew, Billy beer.

MOSES: This was after Jimmy became President. Billy capitalized on his newfound fame as the beer-drinking brother of the President. It was a bust.

Q: I mean he was portrayed as a good old boy red neck and all that.

MOSES: All those things.

Q: Which again was not helping your cause.

MOSES: Not helping my client, the President. It certainly didn't help with the Jewish community, and it didn't help with the country at large. Jimmy didn't rein him in. Jimmy would say, “I can't rein the guy in. He won't listen to me. I would say go right; Billy would go left.” It was a mistake for the President to give his brother access to government officials in Washington. He could have said, “Look, Billy, Washington is off limits.” But he loved Billy and wanted to help him. If fact be known, he didn't see anything wrong with Billy's helping Qadhafi. He told me, “Billy earned it. He is good at PR.” He didn't see the red line and didn't see the political damage this would cause.

Q: Well, did you in again dealing with the Jewish community, with the Israelis particularly Begin and company help at all or had Camp David sort of been there, done that.

MOSES: No, again it was much more complex.

MOSES: The Israeli ambassador to the United States was Ephraim Evron. He was very clever. He had established a good relationship with Lyndon Johnson years before when he was serving in the Israeli embassy. Eppie worked well with the Carter administration, particularly with Vice President Mondale and Bob Strauss. Truth be known, he brought Shimon Peres, then leader of the opposition, to the White House to meet with Carter. Begin was upset. Eppie was close to the Labor Party, not officially, but in terms of his private preference. A few weeks later I flew with Begin and Eppie to New York. I understand Hebrew. Begin accused Eppie of bringing Peres to meet Carter. Eppie denied it, claiming he had nothing to do with the visit It was all done on the initiative of the White House, he said. I got a lesson on how people deal with heads of government. He was very nimble politically. In the last two days of the campaign, Ezer Weisman who had

been Minister of Defense in the first Begin Government and a hero of the Six Days War came to the United States and campaigned for Carter. It didn't do Carter any good. The political right in Israel was strongly pro-Reagan. So, too, were some Jewish intellectuals in this country such as Norman Podhoretz, editor of Commentary, who had previously been a staunch Democrat. Others, Jewish and non-Jewish Commentary contributors, included Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Irving Kristol and lots more. The Democrats in Congress were not very enthusiastic about Carter. They saw him as a political liability, not an asset. They were proven right.

Q: You know looking back on it, the real problem was Carter, not the other thing. He did not present a strong government. He was in the right thing in a lot of things but...

MOSES: As President, he was not as effective as he should have been. I tried to change things, to give him a sense of how to project himself politically, exuding confidence and power. He lost this after our embassy staff in Teheran was seized. I spoke with him about core Democratic Party issues, but at heart he was a populist. He attacked lawyers, accountants, professional people generally, exalting the mythical, primordial man, right out of Rousseau. The American public did not want to listen; he was too preachy, too glum. In fact, he was a much better president than George W. Bush, but Bush went around the country in 2004 walking and talking as though he were running the world and on top of everything. The American public re-elected him, even though he doesn't have half the candle power that Carter had. Jimmy Carter went around in a mental slouch. He had given his malaise speech in July of '79.

Q: Malaise.

MOSES: The malaise speech.

Q: The malaise speech which really turned me off.

MOSES: It turned everybody off. It was a ridiculous speech. Jody Powell put him up to it. Fritz (Mondale) was incensed by the predictable political suicide. The speech was just dreadful. He wanted to re-energize the country; he thought the country was drifting. This and the hostage-taking killed his presidency. He became the hostage in Teheran but not George W. Bush in Iraq. “No stepping back from terrorists; hit them every chance you can,” is his theme song, and he sold it even though the supposed imminent domestic terrorist attacks were outright lies intended for political purposes to scare the American public and make people believe Bush was protecting American families. Carter had no sense how to portray strength and confidence. If he didn't believe it, he couldn't say it. It just wasn't his style; it wasn't his mindset. Right after Carter was elected in '76, I flew to New York with Ben Rosenthal, a long-time, highly astute congressman from New York. A few days before he had had a long talk with “Little Gene” Talmadge, the senior senator from Georgia.

Q: Yeah, Talmadge.

MOSES: Talmadge told Ben that, as Governor, Carter had ruined Georgia, ruined the Democratic Party in Georgia and, as President, would ruin the Democratic Party nationally. “You will regret the day Jimmy Carter comes to Washington. He is not an effective leader. He didn't accomplish much in Georgia, and he is not going to accomplish much in Washington,” Ben told me. Ben died a few years later. Talmadge's words turned out to be true. Carter also brought his campaign staff to the White House. They were inexperienced in the ways of Washington and, after the first two to three years, were seen for what they were, largely second-rate.

Q: Did you find working in that White House, you mentioned Jody Powell who was his chief of staff.

MOSES: No, Jody was press secretary. Ham Jordan was chief of staff.

Q: Press secretary and Ham Jordan, but those two seemed to have rather both fixed ideas. They were renowned for not making the proper contacts with the hill.

MOSES: That was Jordan. He was arrogant; he was young. He was smart, a good strategist, but basically not up to the task. In 1980, he left to work on the campaign. Bob Strauss needed an assistant and Carter sent Ham. Jack Watson then became chief of staff. Jack was a nice guy but not up to being the President's Chief of Staff. These are all Georgia boys with no prior Washington experience — Jody, Jack and the rest.

Q: Well did you have trouble working in the White House, I mean...

MOSES: With them?

Q: In other words did you feel like this is an isolated White House?

MOSES: I thought it was an isolated White House. I also thought it was a little bit like playing with model airplanes. There was some competence, and certainly toughness. Carter had done some very good things, but I was not impressed with his senior staff. The only two people I thought were in the same league with (pardon my parochialism) Covington partners were Lloyd Cutler, who was certainly preeminent. Speaking frankly, Lloyd had problems as well; he was an extraordinarily able and sophisticated lawyer, but he thought he was commander-in-chief, basically, and could run anything. Regrettably, his competence was not that broad or deep. But he was enormously able. Stu Eizenstat was also highly competent. He had an excellent staff of younger people, and ran a very good operation with sound analyses, well ordered and reliable. Stu's problem was he did not recognize the shift that had taken place in the country. He was still way over on the liberal side. He was way off base when Ham Jordan at a senior staff meeting asked for advice before the aborted Teheran rescue mission. I and only one other staff person spoke up for taking decisive military action. Stu counseled against it on the grounds it would hurt with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party

was not what was up for grabs in the election. Stu did not understand this. I and Hendrick Hertzberg, who is now an editor at The New Yorker, spoke otherwise. Rick was Carter's speechwriter. He is a superb writer and, for a few years, was quite prominent in the Clinton Administration. But certainly Stu was competent, more than competent, excellent, and Lloyd was stellar; but the rest of them in my view were not impressive. Jody in his own way was solid and the press liked him. The president had confidence in him, but he, too, could not see over the horizon very well. He is the one who came up with the idea for the malaise speech.

Q: Were you feeling a leakage of the Jewish vote while you were over there?

MOSES: Day by day, every day. We were trying to salvage the ship, and the President wanted us to succeed. He understood the importance of the Jewish vote. We did what we could. I brought everyone under the sun to the White House looking for fresh ideas and advice. One such person was Alfred Gottschalk, president of Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati. Fred was by no means a fan of Carter, but he was willing to talk and advise. After an hour or so, he said admiringly, “You are doing all this with smoke and mirrors.”

Q: ...how this works between, you know lawyers seem to be able to take off and go off and do these things. I mean it has been a practice that has gone on since the republic was founded. But I would think it would cause difficulty.

MOSES: Well, other people covered for me in my practice. And I was never far away. The day after the November presidential election I argued a case in the Court of Appeals. I even went to South Carolina one day when I was working in the White House to buy a steel business for a client. So long as I did not deal with the Federal Government, there was no conflict. I took a 180-day non-paid position and was not expected to spend more than 80 percent of my time at the White House. The rest of my time I could do what I wanted so long as there was no conflict.

Q: I was going to say you had to be careful not to use the White House.

MOSES: I never used the White House.

Q: This was the White House talking.

MOSES: I never got close to anything like that. If I had anything to do pertaining to my law practice, I would walk across the street to Covington's offices. While serving in the White House, I never interceded on behalf of my clients with anybody in government.

Q: Well while you were doing this, how did you sense where the State Department was going. I mean you mentioned Pat Derian.

MOSES: Patricia Derian was Assistant Secretary for Human Rights. I worked primarily with Harold Saunders, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. Hal cleared a Presidential statement that I drafted that was significant. At the time all of Jerusalem was under Israeli control, as it is today. Under the 1948 Partition Plan, West Jerusalem was to be Israeli; East Jerusalem Palestinian. But in the Six Day War Israeli forces occupied all of Jerusalem. Later Israel annexed all of Jerusalem. I wrote the President's statement, with Hal's blessing, that, “The political status of Jerusalem will not change without the consent of the parties, and that includes Israel.” It meant that basically Israel's annexation can never change without Israel's consent. In other words, the President's statement should have given considerable assurance to the Jewish community. Jerusalem will remain Israeli unless the government of Israel decides otherwise. This was a major statement 27 years ago. Today people take it for granted. Sam Lewis, our ambassador, had the confidence of the President. Sam was one of the few people at State who realized in 1977 that Begin was not going to be a short-term prime minister. Others viewed his election as an aberration and thought the Labor Party would be back in power in a year or two. Sam knew otherwise. And he was right. Both Begin and Carter trusted Sam. He was quite effective. It was a tumultuous period. Our own policies were difficult to

implement. For example, a U.S. official could not go to East Jerusalem. In '77, Vice President Mondale wanted to visit the Western Wall which under the Partition Plan is officially in East Jerusalem. Max Kampelman who accompanied Mondale on the trip worked it out so that the Vice President entered through the Dung Gate, making it an unofficial visit. So there were all these prohibitions and inconsistencies, most of which were blown away during the Reagan Administration.

Q: What about where stood while you were doing this, the settlement policy or problem?

MOSES: Well, it was clear that President Carter thought the settlements were an obstacle to peace. I don't know if State ever said they were illegal, but if it didn't use that exact word, it said something close to it. Before I took the job at the White House, probably a year or two earlier, I gave a speech to the American Jewish Committee's Board of Governors in which I said that the settlement policy, as it was then being implemented, would make the settlements hostage to reaching an accommodation with the Palestinians. I made specific reference to the proposed settlement in Alon Moreh that had Biblical importance but not otherwise. My warning turned out to be correct. The dividing line for me was settlements that had made sense militarily and would enhance Israel's security, not just accommodate settler ambitions.

Q: This is tape 3 side 1 with Al Moses.

MOSES: I was opposed to settlements that were authorized in order to change “conditions on the ground.” In other words, put a finger in the Palestinians' eye. Why occupy land that had importance Biblically but had no military importance. If there ever is a peace agreement, these settlements will be on the wrong side of the line. I thought I spoke with vigor and was persuasive. I ended up getting about eight votes out of 100 or so. I remember the one person who spoke out most adamantly opposing me was Rita Hauser, who later became a dove. At the time she was running for lieutenant governor of New York and was trolling for Jewish votes. Apparently, she thought she had to be to the right of

Menachem Begin to win. Not having much support, she later withdrew from the race. She then did a 180-degree turn. So much for politics.

Q: What about did you get involved in this thing for, God it seems like forever. Every time there is a primary for the President in New York, each candidate gets up and strongly supports the movement of our embassy to Jerusalem and that never happens.

MOSES: That's right. Carter did not call for moving the embassy to Jerusalem. I think Reagan was the first President who did. I don't know what George H.W. Bush said in '88. My guess is Dukakis was in favor of moving it. Clinton, I think, also spoke in favor. George W. Bush certainly did in 2000. It has never happened. I consider it irresponsible on their part, just vote-chasing. That said, if I were President, I would move the embassy to Jerusalem. There is no reason in the world why it should not be there. The Government of Israel is there. Of course, the Arabs won't like it, but so be it. I would move the embassy and put it in West Jerusalem. It is the capital of Israel. No one knows what the boundaries of Jerusalem will end up being. If we ever have a final settlement, there will be some official Palestinian presence in Jerusalem. But it may be that Ramallah will become part of Jerusalem. Under the Taba Proposal in late 2000, there would have been an official Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem. There would have been a flag and political presence. This may still be what turns out. But I think for us to keep our embassy in Tel Aviv is a denial of reality. If we were to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, would there be anti-American demonstrations in the Middle East? For sure. But we have had those before. Every presidential candidate says he is going to do it and then doesn't. We are doing business and dealing with the Government of Israel in Jerusalem every day.

Q: Well one of the things I have talked to people who have served in Tel Aviv, and the automobile ride is a bit hair raising.

MOSES: It is. The whole business makes no sense. At this point I think we ought to move the embassy and be done with it.

Q: Well I think this is probably a good time to stop. How did you sort of, leave the White House? Was there a feeling of having learned how Washington works, never again or something like that or was it just...

MOSES: No, but there was much more. We ought to go over the last days of the Carter Administration.

Q: OK, yes.

MOSES: They are interesting. I spent some time alone with the President in the last several weeks. I learned what it is like to be in the White House with a President who has lost the election.

Q: Ok we will pick that up...

MOSES: From election day forward.

Q: So we will pick it up right after the election day. I didn't ask you, and we will cover that the next time. I am just putting it here. Was it pretty clear to you and the people around the White House that the election was lost before it happened?

MOSES: No.

Q: Well some people say the president was told just before. Well we will pick this up.

MOSES: He may have been told, but I didn't hear it. The polls had him ahead by one percentage point the Sunday before the election.

Q: Today is 20 June 2005. Mr. Ambassador I think we had skipped some things during the Carter administration that we might go back to. This may be a duplication. So let's talk about some of the things that you got involved in. You mentioned for example, the Andy Young business at the United Nations. Do you want to talk about it from your perspective.

MOSES: Sure. Andy Young was our Permanent Representative (ambassador) to the United Nations. As such, he was a member of the President's cabinet. He was also a friend of Jimmy's. He was from Georgia and had been a very prominent congressman. He was photogenic and a compelling speaker, but a bit of a rebel. He liked to shock, but he also could fit in as a member of the establishment. He was a major name in the United States at the time. His nomination to the United Nations position was a popular appointment by Carter, although, as it turned out, it ended Young's political career. What happened is that he met with Yasser Arafat in the UN, and that was contrary to official U.S. policy. He did this on his own. I think he had the sense that he was above it all, and that he could charm anyone, including Yasser Arafat. He is not the only public official who thought that Arafat could be tamed or changed, neither of which ever occurred. When the word about Andy's meeting with Arafat leaked out, Andy had to resign. No doubt there was pressure from the White House. I do not know if Carter, himself, insisted on Andy's resignation. That was not Carter's way. In fact, Carter had a lot of the same sympathies Andy Young had for the Palestinian cause. When Young left, Don McHenry, who I believe had been his deputy, took over.

Q: Yes he was.

MOSES: Don was also African American. He had the same views as Andy. He was not colorful or charismatic nor as eloquent a speaker, but he was quite determined. He voted on a Security Council resolution pertaining to the status of Jerusalem that Cy Vance had shown in advance to the President who approved the language without focusing on it. All hell broke loose the day after the vote. Mondale in particular was upset. The President issued an official “mea culpa,” in effect reversing the U.S. vote, but the damage was done.

Q: This was Walter Mondale.

MOSES: Yes. I was not yet in the White House. The vote preceded my going to the White House. Walter Mondale saw the Jewish community as a political ally. The Jews, Afro-

Americans, labor, minorities generally, were the backbone of the Democratic Party's support in this country. Fritz was particularly upset with what he considered to have been bungling on the part of the Administration, and the President's failure to be sensitive to trigger issues. Carter himself was quite conflicted. When he ran for President in '76, he was careful to limit his support for Israel to protecting its security. He had also endorsed the Brookings Report that was published a few months before the election.

Q: Well we can add this.

MOSES: Bill was later the President's Special Advisor and Senior Director for Middle East issues on the National Security staff. By the time I got to the White House, Bill was gone. He was replaced by Bob Hunter, who, under President Clinton, was our ambassador to NATO. Carter, himself, no doubt shared the views of Don McHenry and Andy Young. For political reasons and because this was post-Camp David, indeed, post-signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, he had made commitments that did not allow him the latitude that Young exercised and McHenry certainly thought. This may have contributed to Carter's blindness when he approved the text Vance showed him. It caused political turmoil and probably was a major factor in Carter's getting such a low percentage of the Jewish vote. He got 46%, which, had that been the plurality in the election, Carter would have won the election. John Anderson got 14% of the Jewish vote, Reagan 38%, which was high for a Republican candidate. Carter was seriously damaged by what had happened at the United Nations. He seemed incapable of extricating himself from a whole series of anti-Israel resolutions in the Security Council. We later managed to do this for him. Bob Hunter and I worked with Max Kampelman who, at my invitation, came to the White House to confer with Bob and me. Fritz Mondale, too, was very supportive. In fact, it was he who suggested we involve Max. This was after a series of U.S. abstentions on anti-Israel Security Council resolutions introduced monthly by Arab countries. We managed to get Secretary of State Ed Muskie to take a day off from his summer vacation in Maine to give a speech at the UN putting an end to the monthly Arab-sponsored anti-Israel resolutions. The President was not directly involved in our plotting. Don McHenry

was furious. He came to the White House to complain about the “Jewish cabal.” Of course, I was the only Jew. The other persons in the room were Bob Hunter, David Aaron, who was maybe half Jewish, and one or two others. I seem to recall that Dick Holbrooke showed up for some reason. He was Assistant Secretary for Asian Affairs. Dick's parents were Jewish, but he had no Jewish religious education and no real Jewish feelings. His parents were intellectuals. I think his father was a physician, his mother an artist. They rejected the whole notion of Jewish separateness. Dick was brought up without Jewish consciousness. But he was present at the meeting which was in the Situation Room at the White House. Somehow we got through this difficult period. I wrote a briefing book for the President to use in the campaign. It was long, detailed, and, I think, essentially right. I worked very closely with the President bringing Jewish influentials to the White House. We had three sessions in the Roosevelt Room on each occasion with 20 or so Jewish leaders. The President seemed to enjoy the meetings and thought they were worthwhile. But he never caught fire in the Jewish community. Too many negatives had occurred. His off-the-cuff remarks, one at a press conference in Kansas where he talked about the need to deal directly with the PLO, maybe he said the Palestinians, hurt him.

Q: Was there anybody looking at this thing and saying OK, politically this is dynamite, but if you are going to get anywhere, if you don't deal with somebody you are closing a significant door toward bringing peace, or was this an issue?

MOSES: It may have been an issue. If it was, it was not discussed with me. I did not sit in NSC meetings. I was not a confidante of the President in the April, May, June time period. I became close to President Carter once Billygate erupted in late July. From then on I worked very closely with him right through the election. A day after the election we had a senior staff meeting that he chaired in the Cabinet Room. He went out of his way to say nice things about me. We had our picture taken together under the portrait of George Washington. He then inscribed it to me. I remember him saying, “You have done a fine job.

Jimmy.” That was because of Billygate and my efforts during the campaign. Rosalynn was equally appreciative. She was there with him every step of the way.

Q: Now we did talk about Billygate but we haven't...

MOSES: This was a tense period. I believe I mentioned previously I tried to give him a different direction in the campaign, which he didn't pursue. He gave one speech using these themes. It was a talk at B'nai B'rith where he used the refrain line, “We are on the right road to the right future and we will stay the course.” Rich Hendrickson and I wrote the speech. The quotes were my lines. It went over very well, but he did not pick up on it. He remained wedded to his populist, anti-establishment, trust-me rhetoric.

Q: Did you find that Ronald Reagan with his Hollywood background having dealt very closely as an actor and as Screen Actor's Guild with the Jewish community which has always been very strong. Ronald Reagan had close ties to this organization. Was that playing much of a role?

MOSES: I don't think so. I truly don't. Reagan was seen as a right wing Republican which is not where the Jewish heart and soul is. That is why 14% of the Jewish vote went to Anderson. It was just a negative feeling about Carter. His body language was wrong. Billy Carter was seen as a “redneck,' probably an anti-Semite, whether he was or not. (Jimmy always said he wasn't.) Carter's own south Georgia provincialism just didn't travel well in the Jewish community. I was alone with Carter in the Oval Office for a goodly amount of time two Saturdays after the election. He said to me, “Oh sure we got 46% of the Jewish vote, but we expected to do much better, wanted to do much better.” He believed he deserved to do much better. I remember his saying that after the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty he didn't expect to lose Jewish support. He was down in spirit. It was no fun to lose the election. And he lost it. I don't think Reagan won it. People now refer to the debate in Cleveland before the election. Carter's popularity went down a few points after the debate, but it came back a week later when the polls showed he was a point or so ahead. What

did him in was his inability to resolve the hostage crisis. He made an enormous mistake returning to the White House, in effect canceling the campaign, the Sunday before the election. He had hoped to announce the hostages' release that Sunday. When nothing happened, it was seen as further ineptness on his part. The Iranian Government was toying with Carter — raising his hopes and then dashing them. He became, in effect, the real hostage. Indeed, I was with him at the White House the night before the Reagan inauguration. Carter, Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, and Lloyd Cutler, Counsel to the President, left the party around eight to work on the hostage crisis. The next day the hostages were released because they were no longer of use to the Iranians. They had already served Iran's purpose.

Q: Were you picking up any emanations that Casey or somebody was making deals with the Iranians?

MOSES: I don't think so. Anything is possible, but I had no knowledge of it. I did think that Carter had, inadvertently, made himself a hostage. I tried to tell him that by going for the bait (the Iranians' dangling the prospect of release of the hostages), he had put himself under arrest in the U.S. embassy. He did not understand the political damage to him. He didn't start to campaign until April. That was five months after the take-over of the American Embassy in Tehran. Instead of thumbing his nose at the Iranians, he appeared as a beggar or supplicant. He should have tightened the screws on the Iranians as he did on the Soviet Union when it invaded Afghanistan (for which he didn't get sufficient credit). He should have said to the Iranians, “Don't call until you release the hostages.” The political impressions were that he was ineffective, weak, vacillating — in a word, didn't know how to play it. Reagan was very good at “playing it” and deserves credit for bringing a sense of leadership to the country. In my view, on substance he was dreadful. On substance Carter was better. He did good things once he got to the White House, but he had no sales skills. It was all right when he was running for office, talking about reducing government, bringing people into the White House, a new message, a rejection

of Watergate, the whole Nixon legacy, but once he got to Washington, his policies appeared thin and after two years or so, he ran out of juice.

Q: Well were you feeling any problem, because you were concerned with foreign affairs essentially, the Israeli side. Did you get any feeling about not just Carter, but sort of the Georgia mafia around Carter. Were they attuned to this or did you feel they were somewhat tone deaf?

MOSES: They were tone deaf. You had Jody Powell who was press secretary. Jody was good, a smart guy, probably the best of the group. You had Hamilton Jordan who I found to be arrogant, sometimes belligerent, and didn't really know much about building support for the Administration. The Carter team thought he was a political genius, because he had done a good concept paper that helped in the 1976 election. But once he came to Washington, he did not make the transition. He came as a rebel, thumbing his nose at Washington, looking sophomoric.

Q: This is a common trait that crops up again and again. You know, you kind of wish there was a primer of...

MOSES: There was also Jack Watkins, mediocre in talent and ability, but a decent guy. The best of the group from Georgia was Stu Eizenstat who ran domestic policy. Stu was extremely methodical and had a superb staff but sometimes went the wrong way on issues. He was opposed to using military force of any kind in Iran. He was afraid Carter would lose the liberal wing of the Democratic party and Teddy Kennedy would get the nomination. He didn't, in my view, understand that the American people wanted a leader as President. Stu was a superb processor and had a good head for issues. He understood and appreciated the importance of getting along with the Congress, something Carter never adequately faced up to. His congressional relations people were a weak link in the White House. The President and the Congress were at dagger points by the end of Carter's presidency. Carter thought that he could reach out directly to the American

people, could go beyond the institutions of government, go beyond structures in the private sector as well, and appeal to the public on the basis of populism. Once he became president, that was no longer an effective way of communicating. There were a lot of Georgia boys in less important positions in the White House. They were generally hostile and not helpful on issues. They were loyal to Jimmy and he probably was loyal to them, but they didn't bring much. They had no world vision. They didn't know how to get things done. Carter's staff, on a one to ten, was somewhere around a three to a four in terms of effectiveness and ability. Except for Eizenstat and, later, Lloyd Cutler, the staff was not up to the job. But Lloyd had his own baggage. He thought he knew more than anybody else. He probably did, but he didn't work cooperatively. He got a lot of face time with the President. In actuality, the President resented Lloyd's pushing all the time, getting into areas that were beyond his competence and his job. He was a wonderful lawyer but made occasional mistakes. On the Billygate matter he had met with Billy. He responded to overtures from Carter to get the Billy issues resolved and didn't see the train wreck down the track. He was more a rain-maker, pontificator, smart but in the end did not serve the President particularly well. Also, the President had problems at State. Cy Vance and the President didn't see things the same. In the end Vance got chewed up by Brzezinski. At Defense he had Harold Brown and Bill Perry, both of whom were outstanding.

Q: Do you have a feeling that on the matters you were dealing with, that Brzezinski was not serving the President well or not? How did you feel about Brzezinski?

MOSES: Well, Zbig is a friend of mine. He and I became good friends after we left the White House. Zbig is one of a kind. I thought his policy positions were half baked, too quickly formulated. He is a terrific wordsmith. He can put words on paper faster than anyone I have ever known. In those days, the public perception of Brzezinski was almost totally negative. In the White House there were two factions: Zbig who was the hard-liner. Then you had Cy Vance who was more of an accommodationist, much more willing to search for areas of agreement than Zbig. You had David Aaron who had previously been on Mondale's staff in the Senate who was not a Zbig hawk. Unfortunately, Zbig got his

picture taken pointing a rifle in the Khyber Pass at an imagined enemy (i.e., Soviet troops). Played up in the press, this looked dreadful. When crises occurred, I don't think Zbig was the right go-to person. When the hostages were taken by the Iranian “students,” Zbig jumped at Rosalynn Carter's idea to use Billy Carter as the go-between with the Libyans. The Sunday after the hostages were taken, Rosalynn was coming down the stairs from the private quarters in the White House, saw Zbig and suggested, “Maybe Billy's Libyan friends can help.” Instead of saying, “Hey, that's a great idea,” and then conveniently forgetting about it, Zbig immediately got hold of Billy. Zbig just responded to what the President wanted. This started the crazy notion of using Billy Carter as an intermediary with the Libyans that later boomeranged and came close to destroying the President.

Q: Was there a period where Carter and everybody else was pushing every button they could to figure out how to get...

MOSES: Absolutely. Without thinking, they just went in every direction at once. But it was Rosalynn who thought about using Billy and his contacts with the Libyans, even though the Libyans had proven to be totally irresponsible. Qadhafi was so nuts we pulled our ambassador out of Tripoli. There were these half baked ideas, and no one in the White House to say, “Hey, wait a minute, this doesn't make sense.” You need people like that. There were no senior advisors with real experience that were willing to speak up. I had no hesitation speaking up, writing things that were different from what the President had been saying, taking ideas to the President that others were afraid to raise, but I was at a lower level and didn't arrive on the job until it was too late. Most of the staff did not challenge the President. Occasionally, Jody would raise a general staff view with the President, but the others were afraid. As I mentioned earlier, the staff at the White House was weak. The great accomplishment at Camp David came about because of the President's perseverance and tenacity, and the very good staff work of Hal Saunders and others at State. Saunders was the principal drafter of the Camp David Accords. Carter deserves a great deal of credit. He could well have gotten the Nobel Peace Prize in addition to Sadat and Begin; he was the person who made it happen. In a larger sense the genius was

Anwar Sadat in terms of bringing it about, but he did not work on the details. That was Saunders, but the parameters were set by Sadat.

Q: Were you able when you were brought in with particularly the Jewish community, to play on Camp David at all?

MOSES: It was too late.

Q: Well how did the Jewish community feel about Camp David from your standpoint?

MOSES: When the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed, at first the Jewish community was ecstatic, but then the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty did not help with the Palestinian issue. The Camp David Accords called on Israel to recognize “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people,” one of those purposely vague diplomatic phrases that meant one thing to Begin, another to Sadat and a third thing to the Palestinians. Talks between Israel and the Palestinians moved at a snail's pace. First Bob Strauss, then Sol Linowitz conducted the talks as the President's representative. There were thirty-some issues on the table. Things just didn't move. Strauss at the direction of the State Department convinced the two sides (plus Egypt) to break into working groups. They then began to tackle the issues more specifically. Sol took over from Strauss when the President brought Bob back to Washington to head the campaign. Sol was much more systematic. He could look at the details, think things through and work toward a solution. Bob Strauss was a big issue guy. He wasn't one to read briefs or write reports. He was more of what you would call a talking head, not without a streak of genius, but relying more on instinct and hoping for the best. He had good political insights, was a great fund-raiser, a good people person, and a lovely guy, a really genuine person. Sol was much more calculating, he played his cards much closer to his chest. He had two able assistants: Andy Marks who practices law in Washington, and Ned Walker, now an ambassador. Sol proceeded in a very professional way and made some progress. But then Carter lost the elections so the process came to a halt. In a word, shortly after the Egyptian-Israeli Peace

Treaty was signed, the Jewish community began to lose confidence in Carter. Carter in his heart-of-hearts was closer to the Palestinian perspective than the Israeli. At the same time, on domestic issues he seemed to be waffling on matters that were important to the Jewish community. He wasn't seen as a strong leader who understood, or could empathize with, Jewish concerns. He was seen as a President who said the right things, almost against his will because he had to politically, but his heart wasn't in it.

Q: Well then, you were there and the election came. What happened in the White House from November 3rd or whatever it was until January 19?

MOSES: Not much. Carter threw in the towel on election day. Late in the afternoon the entire senior staff was called to the White House for an announcement that meant he was conceding the election to Governor Reagan although the polls had not yet closed in California. Jesse Jackson was with him which again gave the wrong message. Jesse was perceived to be anti-Israel and anti-Semitic. He had earlier referred to New York as Hymie Town. A day or two after the election Carter met with his senior staff in the Cabinet Room. Brzezinski gave a very sycophantic talk, claiming that the Administration had been consistently right on the issues, and that history would confirm this. I did not believe it. After that it was largely the doldrums; not much happened. Lloyd Cutler went back to his law firm, and other Carter people started looking around for jobs. I think I talked earlier about going to see Carter in the Oval Office on a Saturday afternoon ten days after the election. I was concerned that Carter would sell AWACs to the Saudis. I was trying to protect Mondale. Carter received me warmly. There were just the two of us in the Oval Office. He was tie-less, sitting at his desk wearing a sweater. I sat across from him. We talked about the election, his disappointment at the results. He asked what went wrong with the Jewish vote. I did not hold back. I told him Billy had hurt, as did the vote in the UN Security Council on Jerusalem, broader doubts in the Jewish community about where he stood. We then turned to the AWAC sale. He brushed off my comment about Mondale in 1984 saying he was going to do what was right to protect Saudi Arabia. There was no doubt in my mind that he intended to authorize the AWAC sale. I explained to him that

his approving the sale after the election would be seen as gratuitous on his part. Why not kick it over to the Reagan Administration? Further, if he approved the sale now, it would look as though he had intended to do it all along but waited until after the election in order not to lose the Jewish vote. As it turned out, the Reagan Administration asked him to hold off the sale, which he did. Then the Reagan Administration supported it. The Saudis got the AWACs. Four years later, Fritz got about 70% of the Jewish vote, which was much better than Carter had done in '76 or '80, but there was no third party candidate as there had been in 1980. The Jewish vote for Reagan went down from 38% to 30%.
In the waning days of the Carter Administration, I was winding up the Billygate hearings with the Justice Department. I also represented members of the White House staff in various investigations. I was the only trial lawyer on staff. I also did what I could to help people on my staff get jobs. Two of them became ambassadors: Marc Grossman and Mark Ginsburg. In the end, I had very good people working with me. Zo# Baird helped with the Billygate hearings. It was wind-down time and a rather sad time. Carter remained aloof. He did everything correctly in terms of sending notes to his staff and pictures. We had dinner in the East Wing of the White House before Christmas which I found sad, but Carter performed well, reading from Dickens. He was very clever in his presentation. He was a man of enormous ability, intelligence and dedication. But like the rest of us he had his idiosyncrasies, most of which were known to the public and are now largely forgotten. He was a good public servant. Certainly, his heart was in the right place and he tried to carry out the job honestly. He had a distaste for politics per se. And as President you have to be not only a good leader, dedicated to the best interests of the country, but also a good politician. His failure was his inability to work with the other institutions of government, primarily Congress, and to understand that once he got to the White House, the public wanted a leader, not a preacher.

Q: Well then you left, about January 19 or so, you left the White House.

MOSES: After the Reagan inauguration, we went with the Carters to Andrews Air Force Base. My wife, a photographer, took pictures of Amy on the steps of Air Force One with

tears in her eyes, Jimmy and Rosalynn next to her with chins up, their sadness showing through. It is a very revealing picture.

Q: Well then what did you do?

MOSES: I went back to Covington & Burling. In a sense, I had never left. I had been a Special Government Employee. My Covington pay was reduced and I spent 90% of my time at the White House, but I was still a Covington partner. And I confess I felt a bit at a loss being back in private practice after the intensity of the White House. Fortunately, my clients had not left, so I picked up where I had left off. I remained fairly close to the President. I would call him occasionally. If he was not there to take the call, he would promptly call back. I remember on one occasion he said, “How are you doing?” I said, “Fine, Mr. President, but to tell the truth, I would rather be in the White House.” He said, “I would too.” That was pretty good. He asked me if I had Lloyd under control. I think he always thought Lloyd and I were in the same law firm or all lawyers in Washington were in one law firm.

Q: It gives a feel for his feel of Washington.

MOSES: Oh, exactly. I continued to try to get Jews out of Romania. I went to Romania many times after 1980.

Q: Well what were you finding in Romania? Was there a change in attitude or how well Ceausescu...

MOSES: Ceausescu went from bad to worse.

Q: Were you seeing this go down, down, down?

MOSES: I suppose so but, again, I wasn't living in Romania as a Romanian, so I wasn't personally suffering. I think the economic situation in the early 1980s was more or less constant. It wasn't as desperate as it became in the last years of the Ceausescu regime.

Also, the oppression became ever greater as the years went by. Ceausescu became more megalomaniac. I was in Romania in December 1984 and again the following year for the Chief Rabbi's Hanukkah tours. I took two of my daughters with me, one of whom, Amalie, stayed for three or four weeks after I left to take pictures of the Jewish community in Romania. I went several times for a client to buy steel. On each occasion I would visit with the U.S. ambassador. In 1981 it was Dave Funderburk. I may have mentioned Dave was proposed by Senator Jesse Helms. He was a Helms prot#g#e from North Carolina.

Q: This was Funderburk?

MOSES: Funderburk. He had a rocky career. He later wrote a book entitled Pinks and Pinstripes, or something like that. It was a nutty book. There was one critical sentence about me, but he didn't explain why he was critical. He was truly a loony guy. He did all kinds of things that put him in bad odor. One example: Vice President and Mrs. Bush visited for a day while Dave was ambassador. Ceausescu didn't see them for dinner until 10:00 or so. While waiting for Ceausescu, Funderburk fell asleep and didn't show up for dinner. President Bush later told me Funderburk was about as bad an ambassador as he could imagine. He gambled with Marines, drank a lot, and used to show pornographic movies at the residence. He was a disgrace. Even though he supported annual renewals of MFN (most favored nation tariff status) for Romania, when he was no longer ambassador, he testified in Congress against MFN for Romania. He was a chameleon, no principles, not a very bright guy and way over his head. He had certain basic prejudices. He was also reported to be anti-Semitic, or so I was told by the Israeli ambassador to Romania. No doubt that was true. A pathetic fellow. I think Helms later got a job for him working for the tobacco lobby. He was involved in a traffic accident “driving under the influence.” He left the scene, and came back with his wife behind the wheel. She was a pathetic, much abused lady. She herself had gotten into trouble in Romania according to Reuters. That was a sad period, but I did use Dave, without his knowledge or even awareness, to help Cornelia Bogdan, a former Romanian ambassador to the United States who was back in Romania and had fallen out of grace

with Ceausescu. I invited him to lunch with me in Bucharest in the Presidential Suite on the top floor of the Intercontinental Hotel which my client had reserved. I remember we had a sumptuous steak lunch, something out of the ordinary during Ceausescu's rule. I invited Funderburk to give Bogdan cover so that the Securitate (Romanian secret police) would know that Funderburk had met Bogdan. This gave Bogdan some protection. I don't think Funderburk knew what it was all about. It was all just a mystery to him. He probably saw Bogdan as just another Romanian communist, which he had been and still was, but had fallen out with Ceausescu, and at that point was in jeopardy of going to jail. During this period, I also traveled to Egypt. I met with President Mubarak two weeks after Anwar Sadat was assassinated. A few days later I met with Begin in Jerusalem. I also spent time in Germany where I became particularly close to Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister. I continued to be active on the foreign policy scene. I worked very closely with Roz Ridgeway who was our Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Roz was marvelous, as was George Schultz. At my urging the two of them saved the Great Synagogue in Bucharest. I received a telephone call from Ely Rubinstein, now a Justice on the Israeli Supreme Court, but then the Charg# in the Israeli Embassy in Washington. (Meir Rosenne, the ambassador, was in the hospital recovering from a heart attack. Meir used to quip, “I always told people I had a big heart.”) Ely's call was to tell me, “I have a message for you from my government. [pause] We know that you have been active in Romanian affairs and my government wants you to know that we have special relations with the Government of Romania, and some of the things you are doing are interfering with that relationship. In particular, your intervention to save the Great Synagogue in Romania . . ..” I replied, “Ely, is that the message?” He said, “Yes.” I then said, “Ely, please tell your government that I am going to do whatever I can to save the Great Synagogue, and I don't care what your government thinks.” Ely shot back, “I read the message from my government. On a personal note, I agree with you,” and hung up.

Q: Well what was going on over there?

MOSES: Ceausescu was building the Avenue for the Victory of Socialism.

Q: Oh yeah, this horrible...

MOSES: He tore down two square miles in the center of Bucharest. The Great Synagogue was in the way. The small Jewish community that remained felt an attachment to the Great Synagogue. Certainly the Chief Rabbi did and asked me to do what I could to save the Great Synagogue. Which I did. I was at State a great deal in the '80s. Roz Ridgeway always met with me. It was easier for me to see assistant secretaries then than today. I always saw Hal Saunders, Roz, Ed Djerejian, Nick Veliotes. They were very open, very welcoming. Secretary Schultz on the margins of the UN General Assembly meeting in 1988 buttonholed Foreign Minister Tutu and told him that if the Great Synagogue was destroyed, it would irreparably harm the relationship between our two countries. That is what saved the Great Synagogue. It was Roz and George Schultz. I was the instigator. I had no official position that merited attention. But I came away from my White House service, and I say this with total immodesty, with a good reputation in Washington. People paid attention to what I had to say. I had an op-ed piece in The New York Times, a couple of op-ed pieces in The Washington Post. I had friends at State who looked out for me. Although a Democrat, I was regularly invited to the Secretary's or the Vice President's dinners for Israeli prime ministers' visits. This continued through the Bush years. These were people I had worked with and who were thoughtful and considerate in including me. During this period, I was also close to successive Israeli ambassadors. I would go to official dinners the U.S. government gave as well as the dinners the Israeli government gave.

Q: Well I think we agreed to stop about his time. I will put here at the end, we have reached the point where the Reagan Administration is in. You have talked about helping keep the Great Synagogue of Bucharest from being leveled for this grandiose Ceausescu...

MOSES: And it is still there. It is in disuse but it is still there.

Q: And you have talked a little about how you have been included in various things. I was wondering whether you have talked about relations during the Reagan Administration where you were keeping your hand in with the Jewish community vis a vis Israel and this sort of thing. If you would like to talk about your view of the Reagan Administration and maybe the role of George Bush but also those around Reagan. Reagan as with most administrations, the foreign policy evolved. Mainly it was a learning curve than anything else. If you could talk a bit about that.

MOSES: Sure.

Q: Great.OK, today is 20 July 2005. Well let's start, you were working with the Reagan Administration. Again what were you doing with them?

MOSES: I didn't work for the Reagan Administration, again I was active and involved on Jewish issues, Israel and the fate of the Jewish community in Romania. It was on these two prongs that I had dealings with the Reagan Administration, primarily the Department of State. Coming into office, Reagan was an unknown quantity on Middle East issues. He had some limited dealings with people in the entertainment community in Hollywood who were Jewish, most specifically Lew Wasserman.

Q: He was an agent...

MOSES: No, Wasserman was a major figure in the motion picture industry. He owned Universal Studios, and had employed Reagan. He always referred to him as Ronnie. He was then, I suppose, in his 80's, some ten years or so older than Reagan. There was a mutual fondness and respect between the two. Reagan had this exposure to the Jewish world through Hollywood. He came here, if I read him correctly, with a sympathy for Israel which wasn't shared by everyone in his entourage either in the White House or in the State Department, certainly not by Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense. Two things

happened. You had the Israeli invasion of Lebanon which produced enormous tension when Israeli troops surrounded Beirut. The United States negotiated Yasser Arafat's departure from Beirut to Tunis with a goodly number of PLO forces. That averted an Israeli occupation of Beirut. But along the way Israeli forces and U.S. forces looked each other in the eye, and at one point it got ugly. Weinberger said some negative things about Israel, and Israeli forces. Phil Habib, who was President Reagan's special envoy at that point was able to defuse the situation, but it was a bit ugly. Alexander Haig was Secretary of State. He was straight up ex-military, who when he was no longer Secretary of State, was very sympathetic to Israel. But, as Secretary, he didn't show that same understanding of Israel's isolation and security concerns. He was succeeded by George Schultz, who, coming from Bechtel Corporation with extensive business dealings in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East, was thought to be anti-Israel. That later changed dramatically.

Q: Well part of the thing was that Bechtel had done a hell of a lot of building in the middle east.

MOSES: That is absolutely true, but Schultz himself when he originally came in made a statement (I can't recall the exact date, but I think it was in August of '82), which was very confrontational vis-a-vis Israel. It was clearly unfriendly. But that changed, and it changed within a year or so when he concluded that the Syrians were lying to him, that Assad was lying to him. After that, he became much more sympathetic to Israel's concerns. He had very close contacts in the Jewish community including a prot#g# at the University of Chicago, a young economist who was Jewish. He was killed or died, I am not sure which, some 20+ years before. Schultz ended up being enormously supportive and understanding of Israel. At the same time it was he who reached out in '88 to Yasser Arafat at Stockholm to end the no-talk policy with the PLO. It was aborted a year or two later when Leon Klinghoffer was killed by a Palestinian terrorist and thrown off a ship in the Mediterranean.

Q: Abu Nidal?

MOSES: Abu Nidal, exactly. The United States again broke off relations with the PLO. That was under Jim Baker. We didn't talk to the PLO officially again until after the Oslo Accords in 1993. That was under Bill Clinton. Schultz started out being seen as hostile to Israel, then swung the other way. He was also very supportive of Jewish interests world wide. He attended a Seder in Moscow in 1986 or 1987 arranged by our embassy. The embassy person who arranged that Seder was Mike Einik, later my DCM in Bucharest. He was then a political or economic officer in the U.S. mission in Moscow. Dick Schifter, our Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, was with Schultz in Moscow. It was he who asked the Secretary to attend the Seder. Schultz told the Soviet Foreign Ministry he had to leave a meeting to attend a Seder at the American Embassy, a clear message at a time when the exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union was a big issue. The “Seder” commemorates the exodus of Jews from Egypt over 3000 years before. As I said earlier, it was Schultz who was instrumental in saving the Great Synagogue in Bucharest when he told the Foreign Minister of Romania on the margins of the General Assembly in New York that if the Great Synagogue was destroyed, it would have serious repercussions for our bilateral relationships. He was very understanding. He met regularly with Jewish leadership. I attended those meetings. He would spend an hour or two just going over the issues. He was accessible and very effective talking with Jewish leadership. It would usually be a group of eight or ten. I don't recall White House meetings. Most of my dealings in the Reagan years were with the State Department.

Q: Did you get involved in a very contentious issue, and that was the Israeli desire to sell arms technology which had a connection to the United States technology which they may have put additions on to. But anyway they were selling to people that we really didn't want them to sell to such as China.

MOSES: I was never involved with these issues. They came up later. Under the Reagan Administration, there were two issues, first the AWACs sale, and then the proposal by the Administration to sell F-15's to the Saudis.

Q: It was the 16 I think.

MOSES: The F-15 was produced by McDonnell-Douglas. Yet, Senator Jack Danforth from Missouri opposed the sale. That was very courageous on his part. He voted for the AWACs sale, but later told me the Administration had lied to him. Jack was, and is, a Republican. When the F-15 issue came up, even though that sale was important to his state because there were McDonnell-Douglas assembly plants in Missouri, he voted against it. I don't believe I was involved in Israeli arms sales issues. I was of two minds on that. I understood Israel's belief that it needed a robust arms industry to supply the IDF, and that unless it sold arms overseas, it couldn't support the industry. In other words, the requirements of the IDF were not sufficient, in and of themselves, to support a broad-based arms industry. That may be true, but I never felt that I, as an American Jew, should be taking a position on those issues, and to the extent that Israel was selling arms that had an American component and those sales were prohibited under agreements between our country and Israel, I supported the position of the United States Government. My loyalties are to the United States, and if there is a bilateral agreement, the Israelis should live up to it. That is my view, but I have never been involved where I had to make the choice.

Q: I have talked to some people who have been involved at the State Department on the economic control side and found this to be a very difficult issue.

MOSES: It is a troublesome issue, and I am sympathetic to Israel, but, if you make a deal, you should stick to it. It was foolish on the part of Israel because in the final analysis the security of the State of Israel depends on the United States, and it should do nothing to weaken or jeopardize the relationship.

Q: When the Bush I administration, this is '89 to '93, were you involved in that?

MOSES: I was at the White House frequently. I met with Brent Scowcroft several times. I met with President Bush in New York at the Waldorf Astoria, a meeting that lasted several

hours. I was at the White House from time to time for meetings on Jewish issues. I was at State regularly, and met two or three times with Secretary Baker. We developed a friendship in the last year or so of the Bush administration. He had softened a bit at the edges and was reaching out to the Jewish community. But these were also times of great tension, particularly when several thousand American Jews came to Washington to lobby for credits for the Government of Israel to build housing for Soviet Jews flowing into Israel.

Q: That had to do with settlements on the West Bank didn't it?

MOSES: No, it wasn't the settlements issue. I have never supported the settlements. I did support the credits. The construction was to be within the Green Line; much of it was in the Negev around Beersheba and other areas to the south. Bush made a statement from the White House which talked about “those people,” and that he was the one lone guy up here protecting our government. He did not say these Jews are here trying to wheedle money out of the Congress, but it was pretty ugly. That is the reason a few weeks later he met with us in New York. There were other tense moments. Jim Baker could be acerbic. In answer to a question in testimony before the House International Relations Committee, he said in effect that if the Israelis wanted to talk to him, they knew his telephone number, the telephone number of the State Department or the White House, whatever it was, and they should call. He was fed up with then Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. But in late 1991 there was also the Madrid Conference. The Palestinian delegation was present, the Syrian delegation was present, the Israel delegation. So that was a time of hope. I met with Shamir frequently, offered advice, sometimes to the Israeli ambassador in Washington. I met from time to time in Israel with Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, leaders of the Labor Party, both ex-prime ministers. So it was an exciting time, a time of movement and hope, particularly after the first Gulf War. I went to Israel on the second day of the Gulf War.

Q: Well did you get involved with essentially keeping Israel, our concern that Israel might enter the Gulf War and screw things up?

MOSES: I went to Israel, I think, on the 19th of January, maybe the first day of the war, certainly immediately after the first SCUD landed in Israel. I stayed a few days. Deputy Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger came to calm the Israelis who were threatening to attack Iraq in retaliation for the SCUD attacks. He promised the Israelis that the United States would supply Israel with Patriot missiles. In return, Shamir made the decision not to intervene, which is what the United States wanted. This was over the objection of Moshe Arens who was then Defense Minister. Moshe is a good friend. We were together for dinner the last time I was in Israel. Moshe's view was that Israel should take whatever military action it deemed appropriate, in its own interest, regardless of what the United States wanted. But that view did not prevail. I am glad it didn't. There was tension over this issue. That was an Israeli decision. If I gave counsel, and I don't remember whether I did, my advice would have been not to intervene. In my view, as long as the United States was extending military cover for Israel, it should remain on the sidelines. As it turned out, the Patriots were useless, but none of us knew that. Psychologically, they were important. I did work very closely with the Israelis on the post-war aid package. The Israelis received about $600 million as compensation. Baker had told the Israelis to wait, not seek aid immediately after the war. He promised to look out for Israeli interests in a supplemental appropriation later. Here I think I did make a difference. I strongly urged Zalman Shoval, the Israeli ambassador, not to wait. He asked for my counsel on whether Israel should press ahead for the $600 million or wait. The problem with Baker's promise was that in the interim Israel would be hostage to the State Department. If Israel incurred the displeasure of Baker, there went the promise. I told Shoval that Baker is above all a realist. He respects power and resolve. Israel suffered real economic loss as a result of the war. A promise of future aid might not result in anything material. Shoval voiced concerns about the exercise of power and how this would be perceived. I replied that, “You don't have power unless you are prepared to exercise it, and this is the time. Otherwise, you are going to be seen as the mouse that roared.” He brought in two other advisors. I persuaded them as well, although they were not entirely convinced it was the right decision. Then, in my presence, Shoval called AIPAC to tell it Israel was going ahead with the aid package.

So there, I think, I was instrumental in getting the Israelis to do what I thought was right. It was not what Jim Baker thought, or wanted the Israelis to do. But I frankly thought Baker was putting them off. I think I was right.

Q: Well then when the Clinton administration came in, in '93, in the first place did you play any role during the election campaign?

MOSES: The only role that I recall is that I got a call from the Clinton campaign in Little Rock telling me that Governor Clinton was going to meet with Yitzhak Rabin and would I write a paper for Clinton to use as talking points. It was a hell of a good paper. But unbeknownst to me Martin Indyk was also asked to write a paper. I don't know who asked Martin; I know who asked me. My guess is Sandy Berger or Tony Lake, someone higher up in the campaign, made the request. Martin may have actually been in Little Rock. He wrote the paper that Clinton actually used, and then became Clinton's principal advisor for Middle East issues, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and still later our ambassador to Israel. I don't think Clinton ever saw my paper. I didn't see Martin's but I am sure it was excellent. That was the only thing that I recall doing in the campaign. I met Clinton a couple of times, but I was not involved in the campaign. I was not a financial contributor to Clinton. His financial head, Mickey Kantor, called me, but I was out of town. It was in the summer, and I was in Maine. I am sure he was calling to ask for money. That was his job. I missed his call, so that when I became ambassador a year and a half later, I was probably the only political appointee who had never given a nickel to Clinton.

Q: Well come to the point, how did you become Ambassador to Romania?

MOSES: That is very straightforward. I had been active for some 15 years getting Jews out of Romania. This began in February '76 and continued until Ceausescu was overthrown in 1989. Thereafter I continued to go to Romania once or twice a year to meet with the Jewish community and in particular with then Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen. In the fall of 1993 I had lunch with my friend and deputy when I was in the White House, Marc

Grossman, who was Executive Secretary in the State Department. Marc reminded me that I had once thought about being ambassador to Romania. He said now was the time. Our then ambassador, John Davis, planned to retire and there would be an opening. If I was still interested, I should get moving. The opportunity as well as the challenge grabbed me. Then the reality sank in. I knew neither President Clinton nor Vice President Gore; they owed me nothing. How was I going to become ambassador? It would probably go to a foreign service officer or someone close to the Clinton Administration, and I was neither. Marc was not unmoved by my reality check — “At least make the effort,” he said with a big smile. I thought he was telling me that if my candidacy gained traction, State would not push for its career person. At least that is what I inferred from the conversation. I was hooked. That night I mentioned it casually to Carol, my wife, who thought it was a nutty idea, that it wouldn't happen so why not go ahead and try. Next was Barbara, our oldest daughter, who, not knowing the odds, thought it was a great idea. So I started thinking about people who might help. President Carter was first. I called Jimmy. He immediately said, “Sure, send me a letter so that I know what you have done that is relevant.” He promised to call President Clinton. And he did. My friend Lane Kirkland was head of the AFL. Lane was supportive. At the time the Clinton Administration was reaching out to Lane. The AFL opposed NAFTA. The Administration had already won that fight and was looking for ways to re-establish its important relationship with organized labor. I had a friend and client, a lawyer in Arkansas, Lou Ramsey, who had been chairman of the Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas when Bill Clinton went from Yale to Arkansas to teach law. Lou made a strong pitch for me. Through my position as President of the American Jewish Committee, I also knew people at the White House. Rahm Emanuel was very helpful. I also got a big boost from another friend, Dick Schifter, a Senior Director on the National Security staff at the White House. Unknown to me at the time, Dick sent a strong note to Sandy Berger and Tony Lake. So they endorsed me. I didn't know either Sandy or Tony, but Sandy in particular went out of his way to tell me later that he thought I was “a natural,” knowing Romania as I did. At the time, I did not know this had come from Dick. I had also been reasonably prominent as Carter's special counsel, President of

the American Jewish Committee, and a partner in Covington & Burling. This background was also a fit for Sandy and Tony. They both became friends, wonderful people. I called a few senators I knew, Joe Lieberman and Paul Simon, whose staff aide had been at State and worked with me on Romanian issues, and one or two other Hill people. It all came together. By early January '94 I was able to tell Chief Rabbi Rosen, when I saw him briefly in Washington, that I would probably be the next American ambassador to Romania. He was delighted. Unfortunately, he died two months later. The President approved my nomination in July, my name went to the Senate a few days later, and I was confirmed in September. It all started in 1976 when I got the first Jews out of Romania. The fact that I knew something about the country certainly helped. I knew Ion Iliescu, Romania's president. I hosted a breakfast for him when he was in Washington for the opening of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1993. I knew Romania's Foreign Minister, Adrian N?stase. I hosted a lunch for him in Washington when he visited in 1991. In return he hosted a dinner for me in Bucharest two years later. So I knew my way around. I knew the country, something about its emerging leadership. I looked forward to the chance to be operational on foreign policy issues, always a great love and interest of mine.

Q: You were ambassador to Romania from when to when?

MOSES: From December '94 (I delayed because my wife was operated on for ovarian cancer in November). I didn't go out until the 9th of December. My oldest daughter, Barbara, and I arrived in Bucharest on a snowy Sunday morning in December. My ambassadorship ended September 1, 1997.

Q: Well when you went out there, late '94, what was the state of relations between the United States and Romania?

MOSES: There was a lot of suspicion on the Hill and in parts of the administration concerning Romania's political legitimacy, whether its leaders were truly reformed former communists or persons whose world views still reflected pre-1989 communist doctrines. In

other words, had Iliescu, et al. just changed labels. Official Washington had not embraced Romania as it had Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Romania was still viewed with a great deal of suspicion. The official relationship was correct, but not warm. The ever-sensitive Romanians felt unloved, a little like an unwanted child acknowledged to exist but not loved. Washington thought of Romania as an out-of-the-way destination of no real importance. True or not, it did not deter official visitors — the high and mighty and lots of other folk. Dick Holbrooke and his now wife were the first to arrive, giving a big boost to me personally, but also our entire embassy staff. The irrepressible Dick was at his best, a tad less on subsequent visits. President George H.W. Bush and Mrs. Bush were next, spending two days in Romania. They, like the Holbrooke's, stayed with me at the residence. Both were delightful — President Bush and I swapping stories in the sauna at the end of a busy day and then up the next morning for tennis; he meeting and greeting the embassy staff and others. Having them was truly a treasure. But there were lots of others. Over the next three years we hosted numerous CODELs from both the Senate and the House, CEOs such as Procter & Gamble's John Pepper and Lockheed's Norm Augustine, both of whom were roll-up-the-sleeves guys. Senator Robert Dole spent two days with me in Bucharest, as did Senator Charles Robb, along with numerous other government officials and Hill staffers. There were no major gaffes but lots of uneasy moments. To name only a few, I persuaded the Romanian Government to give Dick Holbrooke a gift after his success at Dayton. This was the post-communist era when medals and the like were verboten. Not to be outdone, President Iliescu's staff at the last minute came up with a gift that most closely resembled the Biblical golden calf. When Dick reached out to touch it, I hurriedly whispered in his ear, “Watch out, the gold paint is still wet.” So, too, with some of the CODELs. Long-time Congressman Floyd Spence of South Carolina who had had several heart attacks, traveled with his nurse who had by then also become his wife. He hopped from country to country at a whirlwind pace and was never quite sure where he was. To avoid embarrassment, he always said, “I am delighted to be in your country,” whatever its name might be. Not so for Senator Robb. During his visit he was preoccupied with the situation in Bosnia, asking everyone from

President Constantinescu on down what the United States should do in Bosnia, never bothering to ask about Romania. The high point for us in the embassy were the visits of First Lady Hillary Clinton and then President William J. Clinton. The visits were a year apart. Hillary came first, arriving in Bucharest on a hot July day, the first stop on a multi-country tour of Central Europe, we thought with an eye toward the ethnic vote in the upcoming November presidential elections. When I went on board the plane to greet her, she was frosty. I was later told that she was upset by a news report that Barbara Streisand had spent the previous night at the White House. We got off to a slow start but as the day progressed, she became more and more open and friendly to the point where, at the end of the day, returning to her hotel, she said, “O.k., Al, let's go schmooze the press.” When we approached the gaggle of press people, she opened by saying to them, “You know Ambassador Moses, don't you?” With no prompting from me, the Reuters correspondent replied, “We sure do; he is the best American ambassador anywhere.” True or not, Hillary had heard enough. She turned to me and said goodnight.

The real spectacular was the visit of President Clinton. This was a real coup for Romania. No American president had visited since Gerald Ford, more than 20 years before. Romania is pro-American like no other country in Central Europe. Five hundred thousand people turned out to hear the President, up until then the largest crowd he had ever addressed. His speech was masterful, written by his speechwriters with a few strokes from Sandy Berger and me. The crowd loved it and so did Clinton. Afterward the two of us motored around Bucharest, stopping first at a peasant museum where he bought armfuls of Romanian products, charming people every step of the way. Later he addressed the embassy staff, Peace Corps and other Americans in Bucharest. They loved it, as did I. On the trip together to the airport we talked about personal things. My mother had died two days before, and he was very supportive. We also talked about Chelsea's career path, NATO expansion, Washington politics and you-name-it. I then flew with him in Air Force One back to Washington.

When the President visits a foreign country (officially coded POTUS), it is a drop-in with two 747s loaded with White House staff, cabinet members, press and various others. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott along with National Security Advisor Sandy Berger were in the Presidential entourage. Later when we met with President Constantinescu, I was seated next to the President after which came Albright, Berger and Talbott. In a failed effort at humor, I turned to Madeleine, and said, “We must be seated chronologically.” (I was by far the oldest.) Madeline ignored my attempt to lighten up, replying in a straightforward manner, “Oh, no, Alfred, you as the U.S. ambassador in Romania are the President's personal representative in country,” something I hardly needed to be told.

Q: This is tape 4 side 1 with Ambassador Moses.Well with this feeling, what was your impression of the government of Romania? Do you feel that this is in our eyes a legitimate government that was really grabbing control or what?

MOSES: It was already in control. I also concluded it was legitimate. The '92 elections were determined by international election observers to be fair. Certainly, the outcome was not subject to challenge. Iliescu had been elected president, but his party (PDSR) did not have a majority in the parliament. PDSR had a working relationship with PRM, the far right cripto-Fascist Greater Romanian Party, and with PUNR, a Romanian nationalist party based in Transylvania. There was also a former Communist Party, now socialist party (PSM), in the parliament, headed by Adrian Paunescu who had various official positions in the Ceausescu days. He supported the government. The opposition was composed of the Peasant Party (Christian Democrats) and the PD, a left-of-center party, headed by Petre Roman who had been Prime Minister under Iliescu in 1990-91. But Iliescu was clearly the key figure. His prime minister, Nikolae Vacariou, an economist of no great renown, did not speak English and was not a major player. He was something of a hot house plant serving Iliescu. Foreign Minister Teodor Mele?canu was very suave, sophisticated, spoke multiple languages, and was effective. The Minister of Defense, Gheorghe Tinca,

had spent his entire career in the Foreign Ministry, but the governing party, PDSR, was short of competent English speakers to head ministries. Our Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry, liked Tinca. I liked him, too, but he was nothing exceptional. All in all, it was a legitimate government. It made mistakes, especially on economic policy, but by and large was moving in the right direction and desperately wanted a closer relationship with the United States. It was suspicious of most European countries, particularly Germany, that it feared, and France, that it mistrusted. I moved on the bilateral front with considerable success. The Romanian Government did most of the things I suggested. This was without instructions from my government. After I had been ambassador two months or so, I laid down a six-point demarche in a meeting with Iliescu. Iliescu took great umbrage, exclaiming that not even Brezhnev had spoken to the Romanian Government the way I did. To which I responded, “That may be, but I am a better friend of Romania than Brezhnev.” Iliescu was silent. It was a pretty tense session. There were only four of us in the room: Iliescu, Mele?canu, my DCM Jonathan Rickert and I. Jonathan gulped hard and all but fell off his chair.

Q: Who was the...

MOSES: Jonathan Rickert. He was not used to a free-wheeling Washington lawyer playing diplomat. But it brought results, and, deservedly or not, the first year I was in Romania, I was seen as an enormous hero. I was continuously on radio and television. The Romanians were lapping it up, because I was a real personality. I was out there on the street; I was going to public events throughout the country. I was pushing hard on the issues.

Q: What were they, there were six points you said.

MOSES: The first thing I took up was the role of the extremist parties — PUNR, PRM and PSM — that had formed a working coalition in the parliament with Iliescu's party, PDSR. I called for an end to the working arrangement. This was done in the fall of 1996.

My remarks were repeated publicly and I was attacked in the press and on television by the extremist parties, one on the right (PRM), one on the left (PSM) and one nationalist, anti-Hungarian (PUNR). I next took up the government's dealing with ethnic minorities, primarily Hungarians and Roma (Gypsies). This, too, improved over time. The government entered into a basic treaty with Hungary as a stepping stone for Romania's entry into Euro/Atlantic structures. The treaty was signed the following year. Efforts underway in Romania to rehabilitate Marshall Ion Antonescu, Romania's wartime Fascist president/dictator, were also on the list. I urged Iliescu to take the steps necessary to disassociate himself and his government in words and deeds from all such efforts by the pro-Antonescu cult. This, too, happened. At the time of my meeting with Iliescu the Romanian Government was “purging” elected opposition officials at the prefect (county) and mayor level. I told him this had to stop and it did. Lastly, I pushed for an improved supply of news print and at better prices for Romanian newspapers. The opposition press was screaming that the pro-government press was being favored. This was resolved and at my urging the government approved the license of a privately owned national TV channel. Where I failed was in not persuading Iliescu to speed up genuine privatization and to take concrete steps to facilitate direct foreign investment.

Q: They all would be nationalities there then.

MOSES: Yes, exactly. We had a treaty between Romania and Hungary, a treaty between the Ukraine and Romania. That came after Iliescu's term of office. It was done under Emil Constantinescu in '97, but I was instrumental in getting both treaties signed, actually talking to the Hungarians and Ukrainians, going to Kiev to negotiate the Ukrainian-Romanian treaty and working with the Hungarian Government and our government as well as with the Romanians to finalize the Hungarian treaty. I was the chief negotiator in concluding both treaties, something no normal ambassador would do if he was in his right mind. I did it and it worked out, so no one fired me once I succeeded. I remember telling Strobe Talbott about the Ukraine Treaty, then being negotiated. He gave his approval reluctantly but was obviously concerned that the Russians would see it as anti-Russian

which it wasn't. But at least he didn't stop me, though I think, if he had his druthers, he would have. As I said, by the fall of '96, PDSR which was Iliescu's party had broken its working relationships with what I called the extremist parties. The firing of mayors stopped. After the Hungarian-Romanian treaty was signed, Hungarian-Romanian relations improved. So we were able to change things in a rather dramatic fashion. In return, I was able to arrange for Iliescu to meet with President Clinton in the Oval Office in September 1995 which was enormously important for Iliescu. Sandy Berger arranged the meeting at my behest. I stayed at Iliescu's side the entire four or five days he was in Washington.

Q: Had he been here before?

MOSES: He had never been in the Oval Office. He was here for the opening of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in April '93, but that was it. A month after the Oval Office visit, he went to Houston at the invitation of former President Bush that I had arranged after President and Mrs. Bush visited Romania in April '95. They stayed at the residence. They both liked Iliescu. Later I called and asked President Bush if he would meet with Iliescu who was planning to attend an energy conference in Houston organized by Joe Grandmaison, the director of the U.S. Trade and Development Agency. President Bush said yes. He very graciously hosted a cocktail reception for Iliescu at his home and then a dinner at his country club. It was a lovely thing for him to do, just spectacular. A year later, Romania obtained permanent MFN status, i.e., most favored nation tariff status. Deserved or not, Iliescu credited me with this. To an extent he was right. There had been a policy debate in the Administration on this issue. Five or six of us were involved. I was able to persuade all but one that the Administration should support permanent MFN status for Romania. The lone dissenter, Dan Fried, is now our Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Q: ??? a lovely guy.

MOSES: Dan didn't see it the same way. He later became a strong supporter of Romania and Iliescu, but at that time he was not convinced that Romania had progressed far enough. Nevertheless, he went along with the majority and we got it done. I was also able to bring the Romanians on board to sign the anti-chemical warfare treaty. In doing so, I insisted that the Minister of Defense, Gheorghe Tinca, sign it himself. I did this because I had doubts about the bona fides of the Romanian Government's commitment. I thought they were cheating on weapons issues with reported sales to Iran and Iraq. I wanted Tinca's signature so I could stick it to him if I later found that they were violating the Treaty.

Q: Had they had a substantial chemical warfare?

MOSES: There were rumors, and there were also intelligence reports that Romania had sold some arms, or other embargoed materials, to Iraq and Iran. I watched this very closely. I had also intervened and then directed the action whereby the Romanian Internal Security Service had apprehended and deported a member of the Japanese Red Army, a notorious terrorist organization. Generally, the relationship between our two countries was moving in the right direction. It improved dramatically when Constantinescu won the election in November, 1996, and became president. Romania then had a Christian Democratic coalition government headed by a Christian Democratic Prime Minister, Victor Ciorbea. Romania was seen much more positively in official Washington. Neither the Administration nor the Hill, particularly the Republican right, had ever fully accepted Iliescu. As a result of the '96 Romanian election, the relationship between Romania and the United States vastly improved, but during the entire three years I was there it was on an upward trajectory. We were able to make considerable progress across the board. We opened the doors for U.S. businesses interested in making direct investments in Romania. Procter & Gamble was a good example. Tenneco came to Romania but later withdrew. Bell Helicopter was there. Chase Bank and Citicorp had operations in Romania as did Xerox and IBM. General Motors and General Electric were both in the wings with small investments. I called Gary Wendt, the president of General Electric Capital, to interest

him in possibly acquiring a bank in Romania. He sent a couple of people to Romania from Budapest and later made an investment in a Romanian bank. Top people from Boeing and Lockheed visited, as did McDonnell-Douglas's COO. They wanted to sell aircraft. I pushed Romania to buy U.S. aircraft for TAROM, its civilian airline that had four Airbuses. We developed traction and did fairly well. Also in agriculture. It was an active time and the United States was top dog in Bucharest. This meant that I as the American ambassador was top dog. I saw Iliescu with great frequency. This was also true of his successor, Emil Constantinescu, who was equally open, accessible, warm and friendly. I have tried to maintain those relationships. When I was in Bucharest in May of this year with President Clinton, I saw Emil. We had a wonderful talk. The next day I went to see Iliescu who was in hospital. I gave him an autographed copy of President Clinton's book that he inscribed with a personal message to Iliescu. True to form, Iliescu gave me a copy of his book similarly inscribed to Clinton.

Q: Were you, was the issue of joining NATO and the European Union a major issue while you were there?

MOSES: For Iliescu and Constantinescu, joining NATO was the preoccupation. A preliminary decision had been taken at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Sintra, Portugal, in May '97, confirmed at the NATO Summit Meeting in Madrid the second week of July, that Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland would be invited to join NATO, not Romania or Slovenia, the other serious contenders. There was considerable disappointment in Romania. Constantinescu agreed to live with the decision, as did Romania's foreign minister, Adrian Severin, who had gotten into a row with Madeleine Albright at Sintra. At one point Madeleine had said the decision would be made on the merits, whereupon Severin spoke up, saying, “That means Romania will get in.” Madeleine was visibly shaken. She felt she had been outfoxed and embarrassed by a “nobody” foreign minister from an unimportant country. But the fact is the United States did not handle the situation as well as we should have. We should have let the Romanians know much earlier that we were not going to support their candidacy. Other governments, at

least nominally, did support Romania's NATO bid. Rather than have it sprawl over to Sintra, we should have stated our position before the foreign ministers' meeting. There were nine countries supporting Romania, two opposed; the other five did not declare one way or the other. The two opposed were the United States and Iceland. Constantinescu immediately called me to ask, “Mr. Ambassador, what did Romania ever do to Iceland?” I thought that was a pretty good line. The obvious answer was “nothing.” The French, for their part, gave the appearance of supporting Romania's bid. Germany's chancellor, Helmut Kohl, told the Romanian ambassador in Bonn that Germany would not stand in the way of Romania's joining NATO. He could say this because he knew the United States had already made its decision. It was a free vote for him. Chirac also knew that in the end Romania was not going to get in. He was able to declare support because he knew it was not going to happen. His principal interest was Poland. The same for Kohl. But Chirac wanted to keep faith with a Francophone country, i.e., Romania, so he gave lip service to support; the Romanians understood this. They knew the game even but didn't acknowledge it. Nevertheless, the Romanians pushed very hard. In June '97 Victor Ciorbea, the prime minister, was in Washington. He came back a second time to see Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. He had seen Madeleine on the first visit and asked to come back a few days later to push again for Romania's NATO bid. It was a mistake on Ciorbea's part. I counseled him against doing this before he left Bucharest for Washington. I met him at the airport and made it clear that whatever the U.S. decision turned out to be, he had to accept it. He could not appeal to the Congress over the head of the Administration. First of all, it wouldn't work, and, second, it would be seen by the Administration for what it was. The decision had already been taken. Basically, he was in over his head. He had no foreign policy experience and behaved in an immature and inexperienced way. He had done nothing in public life before becoming prime minister other than serving a few months as mayor of Bucharest. The fact is that the entire political opposition in Romania pre-1996 had no government experience. Under the Communists there was no opposition. From December '89 to December '96 it was Iliescu all the way.

Constantinescu was a professor, Ciorbea a lawyer. They knew little about government. Both proved inept in office. So there were these problems I had to deal with as well.

Q: How about the Jewish question in Romania or was there one?

MOSES: There is always a Jewish question. Even where there are no Jews, there is a Jewish question. It just seems to be part of human existence. When I arrived in Romania, there were 12,000-15,000 Jews left, mainly elderly. There were outbreaks of anti-Semitism from time to time, regularly in the press on the part of the PRM, the Greater Romanian Party and its leader Vadim Tudor. There was a lot of vitriolic anti-Semitism in Romania Mare, the PRM newspaper. I was the object of a good deal of that. There were issues regarding restoration of property (community and individual) that had been taken by the Fascists and later by the Communists. We resolved those issues in theory, but nothing actually happened. Mele?canu and later Severin, successive Romanian foreign ministers, said the right things, as did the respective Romanian presidents, but there was little to show in the way of deliverables. This is still true. There was also the issue of the state archives. The United States Holocaust Museum wanted to look at materials dating from the period leading up to WWII, the war years and beyond. That was very difficult. The Romanian archivists weren't cooperative. I had spoken to Iliescu as had the Holocaust Museum's representative. Iliescu visited the Holocaust Museum in '95 when he came for the Oval Office visit. He promised cooperation, and I think he tried. His Chief de Cabinet, Traian Chebeleu, and I met with officials at the National Archives. There were promises, but it was always difficult and the results minimal. It was never as full and open as it should have been. There were always reasons, but I think they were excuses, not reasons. So that was a point of concern. The relations between Israel and Romania were generally good. I was not involved in the bilateral discussions. However, I accompanied Iliescu when he flew to Jerusalem for Yitzhak Rabin's funeral in November '95. I do not recall that the Israeli Foreign Minister visited Romania when I was ambassador, and I am quite sure neither the Israeli Prime Minister nor the President did. But there were delegations from Israel's parliament (the Knesset), and I would meet with them at the invitation of the Israeli

ambassador. There was no Romanian/Jewish crisis per se during the time I was there. But there were always issues of one sort or another relating to the fate, destiny and well-being of Romanian Jewry. I was sympathetic, and our government was sympathetic. I wasn't introducing something different from what had been U.S. policy during my predecessors' service. It was a continuation of the policy of the U.S. Government to show concern for ill-treated minorities. We had demonstrated the same interest and support for the Roma community (the gypsy community), and there again I was active in trying to improve the lot of the Roma in Romania.

Q: Well is there anything else we should discuss about your time in Romania.

MOSES: It was an exciting time. I firmly believe we accomplished a good deal. I am told even today that I am looked upon as an historic ambassador who brought about a change for the better in the bilateral relationship. It was so perceived in official Washington, and in Bucharest as well. I was extremely active on all fronts, whether it was meeting with the press, the Romanian Government or Americans of all stripes. I was trying to push Romania in the right direction so that it would become a more credible contender to be a NATO member (which it now is), and eventually an EU member. In order for this to happen, Romania had to do certain things. I stated this publicly and in many meetings with Romanian government officials. I met frequently with the Romanian President. The meetings dealt with matters of substance. I met almost daily with Prime Minister Ciorbea, who spoke and understood English. His predecessor, Vacariou, always needed an interpreter. My meetings with foreign ministers were no less frequent. The same for ministers of defense — Gheorghe Tinca and his successor Victor Babiuc. Much of the credit for whatever success I had in Romania goes to my staff. They were, to a person, magnificent. Usually ambassadors end up canning one or two staff members (my successor fired three secretaries in a row), or reprimanding people. I never did either. I had no reason. The staff supported me and I supported them. My two DCMs, Jonathan Rickert and Michael Einik, were highly experienced in the region and knew Romania. Jonathan spoke Romanian, Mike's wife was born in Romania; her family emigrated to

Israel when she was still a girl. Our Public Affairs Officer, Chris Filostrat, was gifted. He was later promoted to career minister, the second highest rank in the foreign service. He steered me through press conferences, advised me on speeches (which, not wisely, I wrote myself) and was our face to the Romanian media. Our two consul generals, Nancy Pelletreau and Susan Jacobs, were both tops. Nancy, who joined the foreign service 40 years before as a secretary, managed to pull herself up by her bootstraps, ending her career as U.S. Consul General in Romania. Susan upheld the standard, later becoming U.S. ambassador to Papua New Guinea. My political counselor, Robert Whitehead, was a true wordsmith. He was and is one of the Department's most knowledgeable African experts, serving most recently as our charg# in Khartoum. His wife, Agathe, a Rwandan who lost most of her family in the 1994 massacre, was our CLO (Community Liaison Officer), coordinating staff/family activities for the embassy. I was particularly close to Debra Towry, Sarah Solberg and Mihai Carp, all of whom remain close personal friends and have gone on to distinguished careers. There are lots of others I could and should name, including our station chiefs, but the law does not permit it. The embassy staff is always key to an ambassador's success but never more than in my case. My wife, Carol, had intended to accompany me to Bucharest, but a month before I was scheduled to go, she was diagnosed with ovarian cancer. I initially tendered my resignation, but Holbrooke and others at State insisted I go with the understanding that I would return as often as needed to be with Carol. This began a monthly ritual of trips back to Washington for up to ten days, or longer. I tried to make up for my absence by working 14-16 hour days in Romania. By and large, it worked. Carol came to Romania three times in three years, but never felt well enough to stay long.

Q: OK well I think this is probably a good place to stop. Thank you very much.Today is 24 August 2005. Now we are going to talk about Cyprus. How did you get involved in Cyprus?

MOSES: I was serving as American ambassador to Romania when my name was proposed to be Special Presidential Envoy for the Cyprus Conflict. This was in '97. I believe my name was proposed by Marc Grossman who was then the incoming Assistant

Secretary of State for European Affairs. It moved right along. I met with Madeleine Albright, and she in effect told me that I would be the Special Envoy.

Q: Well what...

MOSES: This was in '97. It didn't happen. Dick Holbrook swooped in. He had been offered the job, or certainly was the leading candidate, but said he could not do it because he was writing his book on Dayton. He visited with me in Bucharest and told me the same thing. In fact, he said that I would be the Special Envoy. What he didn't tell me was he had already changed his mind, and wanted the job.

Q: So what happened?

MOSES: He became Special Envoy and I returned to my law practice. Two years later Dick was nominated to be the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN. So the position was open again. For the second time, Marc Grossman put my name forward. Thought was given to others such as Lee Hamilton. I understand that Madeleine decided that Lee wasn't forceful enough. There was also talk of George Mitchell. I think he turned it down. Tom Miller, who was serving as Cyprus Coordinator and later became U.S. ambassador to Bosnia and then to Greece supported me and persuaded Dick to support me. With Dick's support, and Marc's support, Madeleine eventually agreed. I think she had been looking for a bigger name.

Q: Well let me say I am familiar. I never served in Cyprus, but I was consul general in Greece for four years. I left Greece just before the whole mess started where they put Samson in and the Turks came in and all. But why would you as a successful lawyer here in Washington, want to get into that can of worms?

MOSES: That is a good question. You could ask the same question about why did I want to be ambassador to Romania.

Q: Well Romania can be fun.

MOSES: If Romania is fun, Cyprus was a challenge. I like challenges, public service and being involved. It was a perfect fit for me. I did not have to give up my law practice. I served without compensation. The Government paid my expenses but I was not otherwise compensated. I thought the issues were ripe for resolution. I had no hesitation taking the job or any doubt that I was qualified to do it.

Q: Well what dealings had you had with Cyprus, the American Greek community, the Greek Community and the Turkish?

MOSES: Zero.

Q: Zero. Probably just as well.

MOSES: It didn't take very long to get on top of it. The Cyprus problem has a complicated history. But it you get mired in the history, you never come up with a solution. I didn't sense I was at a disadvantage because of my lack of familiarity with the issues on the ground or not having had relationships with either the Turkish-American community or the American Greek community. In a relatively short time I was able to develop good relations with both of them, very good with the Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou. We remain good friends. I think my dealings in Ankara, with the Government of Turkey, were equally good. I pushed very hard. Everything I said was not well received, but the personal relationships were not affected. I was not exactly wheeling-dealing on my own. I conferred with just about everyone in town, seeking advice on Cyprus. I met with Dennis Ross, the U.S. Middle East negotiator, to learn from his experiences. Tom Pickering, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, was a constant font of ideas, as was my friend, Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Marc knew an enormous amount about the region, particularly Turkey where he had served as DCM and then ambassador. Sandy Berger, the President's National Security Advisor, was particularly

helpful and generous with his time. He was probably the most creative in coming up with fresh ideas. I also met with the Washington think-tank people and from time to time brought together previous ambassadors and others having special expertise in the region such as Mort Abramowitz, former ambassador to Turkey, and Nelson Ledsky who had represented the United States in the negotiations on the 1992 Set of Ideas. I also met regularly on the Hill with Senator Paul Sarbanes and Congressman Ben Gilman, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, both of whom had a strong interest in Cyprus, mainly from the Greek perspective. Paul, whom I had worked with on other issues, was the most forceful and respected voice on the Hill on Cyprus issues. But there were others as well. Mike Dukakis called me from time to time, as did John Brademas, the former president of NYU and longtime congressman from Indiana, who also had strong ties to the American Greek community. In a word, just about everybody who cared about Cyprus was on my call list.

Q: Who was it?

MOSES: Farouk Logoglu was Turkey's principal representative. Farouk and I remained friends later during his four years as Turkey's ambassador to the United States. Even though I didn't do what they wanted on all the issues, I also got along well with the Greek American community — certainly with their leadership, two individuals, Andy Athens whom I have known for years, and Andy Manatos. I met regularly with Andy Manatos, less frequently with Andy Athens because he was in Chicago. I met occasionally with representatives for the Greek American community, as many as 30 to 100 at a time.

Q: Could you sort of compare your feeling about, I mean the two major political, you might say ethnic groups in the United States are the Greek American group and the Jewish American group. How did you feel, you know having dealt with the Greek-Americans, they have some real blind spots in my mind.

MOSES: They do. I dealt extensively with the Jewish American community when I was in the White House. The American Greek community is a cake-walk compared with the American Jewish community which had a far more activist, energetic and stronger leadership. By comparison, the American Greek community seemed almost languid, repeating the same mantra year after year. The issue was not life or death, survival or extinction in Greek eyes, but correcting an historic wrong for which the Greek Cypriots were not wholly blameless.

Q: Well I suppose the Greek-American community only had one real issue.

MOSES: That was Cyprus. But one or two organizations. The Jewish community in the United States has Israel and a lot of other issues as well. As the saying goes, there are more Jewish organizations than American Jews, and their views are all over the lot, from hard-liners to peaceniks. Much more difficult. And it was harder still because I was Jewish. Those that didn't agree with me saw me as a traitor, a turncoat or whatever.

Q: Of course you were in a way, I am not sure how things stood at the time you took over, but you know the separate issue seemed to revolve around two men who I think went to school together, Clerides and Denktash.

MOSES: No, they didn't go to school together. Clerides is older than Denktash, but, under the British, they had both practiced law on Cyprus. Clerides was a defense counsel; Denktash represented the Queen. He was a prosecutor. Clerides had studied law at the Inns of Court in London. Denktash's legal education was on Cyprus, not London. He was less of a Britishphile than Clerides. Clerides served in the British Army in the Second World War. So there were differences, but they had known each other a long time. They would refer to each other as “my friend Rauf” or “my friend Glafkos.” But they weren't really friends. They had very different views. Later, President Clinton told President Sezer of Turkey that the Cyprus problem was a problem between Clerides and Denktash. He said, “If those people disappeared, the problem would go away.” There was some truth to it.

Denktash was more than just suspicious. He was opposed to a resolution other than on his own terms, and they changed constantly. His goal was a separate Turkish Cypriot state. Clerides was much more flexible, more forthcoming, easier to deal with — not entirely reliable, in the sense that he was not able to deliver without first having to test the political waters, even among his own political leadership, whom he brought to the negotiations from time to time.

Q: Well what were the issues as you saw them? Why were we in it, and what were we trying to do?

MOSES: The division on Cyprus had the potential to spill into warfare. Turkey and Greece were both members of NATO, and the Cyprus Conflict could have destabilized the Eastern Mediterranean. Our interest was to prevent this from happening. There was also a political imperative, or near imperative. The Greek-American community was pushing very hard in the Congress and with the Administration to resolve the issue. They saw the Turkish intervention in '74 as an invasion of Cyprus, and saw Turkey as the party at fault, rarely acknowledging that it came about in reaction to a Greek Cypriot movement to unify Cyprus with Greece. The government in Athens was a right wing junta. George Grivas and other Greek Cypriots were chomping for unification. Bishop Makarios had been deposed as Cyprus's president. There was chaos and the Turkish Cypriots feared, I think wrongly, but there was real fear, that they would be annihilated by the Greek Cypriots. People like Rauf Denktash saw it as the opportunity for Turkish forces to intervene, divide the island and set up a separate Turkish state, which is what he had wanted all along. So that was the situation. There had been talks at various times since '74, in Switzerland and elsewhere, largely UN supported, that didn't result in movement. Denktash kept raising the stakes. Initially, the talks were about reunification without conditions. Later Denktash insisted that reunification be based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Then Denktash moved from “federation” to “federated” with two autonomous member states, a Greek Cypriot member state and a Turkish Cypriot member state, which meant to him that before negotiating an agreement on reunification, there had to be recognition of the legitimacy and sovereignty

of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, that had been declared in '83 and recognized only by Turkey.

The issues were territory, property, security and governmental structures. Over the years, various ideas had been floated. The last meaningful negotiations had taken place in '92, when the parties came close to agreement on a “Set of Ideas.” But the momentum created ended when Clerides became president of Cyprus. During the election campaign, he had opposed the Set of Ideas. I think he later regretted this, and his regret was an impelling force in his resolve to settle the matter while he was still in office. I served from September '99 to January 2001, some 17 months. During this period, we made considerable progress. We persuaded Denktash and Clerides to come to New York to begin the negotiations. This was a major breakthrough. These were proximity talks. The two didn't negotiate directly but through the UN negotiator, Alvaro de Soto, who in turn met daily with me, my British counterpart and our respective teams. This process finally evolved in the spring of 2004 as the Annan Plan submitted for referendum, approved by the Turkish Cypriots and turned down by the Greek Cypriots, a turnabout from what had been expected a year, or even six months, before. Turkey supported the Annan Plan, as did the government in Athens. But the Cypriot government on the island which was then headed by President Papandreou opposed it. The vote was 70 percent opposed on the Greek side, 65 percent in favor on the Turkish side.

I had a central role in getting the talks started in '99. I spent an entire night on the telephone urging Clerides, who was in Durban at a Commonwealth Conference, to agree to a statement that had been negotiated a couple of months before with the Turkish Government as the basis for convening the talks. After I read to him a statement I wrote on the spot whereby President Clinton assured him that the talks would be conducted on a basis consistent with previous UN resolutions, he finally agreed. The day before on a telephone call with Secretary Albright and me, he had agreed to come to New York for the talks, but then changed his mind. So I had to start over again on a Saturday night. I was able to persuade Clerides in the end. It was important that the two sides be

seen as engaging in at least proximity talks so that the Cyprus Conflict would not be an excuse for the EU to delay further the beginning of accession talks with Turkey. The EU breakthrough occurred in December 1999 at the Helsinki EU Summit Communiqu#. The official communiqu# called for the resolution of the Cypriot issue, but it did not make it a condition precedent to Turkey's beginning accession talks.

I met with Denktash and Clerides for ten days in December in New York leading up to the EU Summit in Helsinki and again in February in Geneva. We were scheduled to meet again that spring in Geneva, but Clerides had an operation for colon cancer. This delayed the talks until September in New York. We later had another long session in Geneva in November 2000, my last. We had come up with two initiatives, both of which I authored and promoted. One was intended to deal with Denktash's insistence that there be prior recognition of the sovereignty of the TRNC as a condition to moving to meaningful negotiations on a final agreement. I came up with language for Secretary General Annan to use which was to the effect that the parties would be equal in the negotiations, and that any final resolution would take into account the equal status of the parties. Denktash saw that as an enormous victory. It was really intended to move Denktash off his position on recognition of TRNC's sovereignty. He played it as a big win, whereupon Clerides played it as a big loss, and withdrew from the talks. I had to hold his hand, literally, in his suite in the Waldorf Towers, before he announced he would continue the proximity talks.

After the round in New York, we concluded that the talks were going nowhere. As a result, I initiated the proposal that the Secretary General set forth his ideas of what a final settlement might look like. We dubbed this the “Clinton Proposal.” The senior Director for European Affairs in the National Security Council, Tony Blinken, and I wrote the briefing paper for Clinton. He was supposed to deliver it to Kofi Annan at a dinner in New York where they would be sitting next to each other. The President said he had delivered it to Annan who had indicated it was acceptable and he would proceed. However, Annan told me when we met in Geneva in November that the President never raised the issue with him. So who knows? We nevertheless decided to treat it as the “Clinton Proposal.”

It was fleshed out by De Soto and his team, then presented by Annan to the parties the third week in November in Geneva. A few days later the Turkish Cypriot side withdrew from the talks with the blessing of the Turkish National Security Council. The Clinton Proposal was the excuse Denktash had been looking for to withdraw from talks that were putting unwanted pressure on him. Denktash went to Ankara to make his case. Both Prime Minister Ecevit and Foreign Minister Cem supported him, so the talks ended. We certainly knew a Turkish walk-out was a possibility but were willing to take the risk. If the Turkish Cypriots were going to walk out in response to the Secretary General's 20 or 25-point paper setting forth what a final agreement might look like, we were not going to make progress in the talks anyway. So we bearded the lion in his den. The Turkish side came back later, but that was after I was no longer the presidential envoy. There was no successor, which I believe was a mistake, but the incoming Bush Administration downgraded the talks.

Q: Were you concerned all the time that no matter what you came up with, that political passions were so inflamed, particularly on the Greek side of the island, that no matter what you came up with, it wasn't going to fly?

MOSES: No, never. If I had thought that, I would not have taken the job. I was always hopeful, not optimistic, but hopeful. There was passion on both sides. It was necessary for the parties to get beyond passion. They still haven't and that remains the problem. There are ways of dealing with the emotional aspects. I so recommended to the State Department this week.

Q: Well the situation really, it just isn't resolved yet.

MOSES: No, it is not resolved. And what is important in my view and should be important in our government's view is that the Cyprus Conflict may block Turkey's EU accession. As I see it, there is no point in going back to the Annan Plan which, as it finally evolved, was enormously complicated. I think the Annan Plan should be put aside to give the

parties time for their relations to evolve on the ground through the movement of people and goods. We will not defuse the problem by going back to the Annan Plan.

Q: What role did the Greek government play in all this?

MOSES: No direct role. Foreign Minister Papandreou was supportive of what I was trying to do. Athens was not nearly as hard-line as the Greek Cypriots. George's larger strategy called for a rapprochement with Turkey generally. Cyprus was an important part of this as were certain Aegean islands Turkey occupied and air and ship traffic in the Aegean. In Papandreou's view, a stable, democratic Turkey fully at peace with Greece, a member not just of NATO but also of the EU, was first and foremost in Greece's interest. We were trying to do that. This would protect Greece's eastern flank. It would benefit both countries if their relations were fully normalized economically and politically. Turkey is an enormous market. Greeks are good business people. There is a lot of business to be done in Turkey and beyond. A stable pro-Western Turkey would be an important link to influence Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and beyond.

Q: Well when you left, the Clinton administration came out and the Bush II administration came in. What have you been doing since? I mean has it been basically back to law?

MOSES: The law for sure. About the time I started working on Cyprus I joined my former law partner, Gene Ludwig, the founder of Promontory Financial Group (PFG), a fast-growing financial services company. I am vice chairman and chief operating officer. This takes most of my time. PFG provides consulting services worldwide and is also involved in developing proprietary products. It has two funds, one a hedge fund, the other a conduit for financing receivables. It is a challenging business, and I am very much involved. I also chair UN Watch in Geneva and a college board in Newton, Massachusetts, and I write and publish.

Q: What college board?

MOSES: I chair the National Board at Hebrew College, Newton, Massachusetts. Its students range from high school age through rabbinical training. I give some time to that. I have remained active, certainly in the private sector. I would like to be more active in the public sector, but I am not a fan of the Bush Administration. I think Bush's foreign policy is a disaster. I don't know how we can extricate ourselves from Iraq; it will not be pretty. Whatever evolves will not be a functioning democracy, with three ethnic groups participating as equals. We did not know what we were getting into and we certainly don't know now how to get out. Iraq is one of the enormous mistakes of U.S. foreign policy, driven largely by the president's fixation on Saddam Hussein without a real sense of what Islam extremism is about, and how to defeat it. So I am not going to be part of this administration, certainly by its choice. Meanwhile, I do visit with officials in the White House and at State. I visited last week with Dan Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to talk about Cyprus. I have a meeting in two weeks with David Welch, our Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. I am meeting from time to time with John Bolton, our UN Permanent Representative, in New York. So I stay involved. I do write papers when asked. Dan and David are career foreign service officers; John is not. But John worked for me at Covington & Burling in the days of his youth, so we have an acquaintanceship and friendship that extends over 30 years. We don't see the world the same way, but we cooperate on issues of common concern.

Q: OK well I want to thank you very much.

End of interview